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1>arvarb College libran?

FROM THE

J. HUNTINGTON WOLCOTT

FUND

GIVEN BY ROGER WOLCOTT [CLASS
OF 1870] IN MEMORY OF HIS FATHER
FOR THE "PURCHASE OF BOOKS OF
PERMANENT VALUE, THE PREFERENCE
TO BE GIVEN TO WORKS OF HISTORY,
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY"

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From October to Brest Litovsk

By LEON TROTZKY

Autborized Translation from the Russian

Price, 35 Cents

NEW YORK
THE SOCIAUST PUBLICATION SOCIETY

243 55th Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.
1919

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2 1

From October to Brest -Litovsk

By LEON TROTZKY

Autkorized Translation from the Russian

NEW YORK
THE SOCIALIST PUBUCATION SOCIETY

243 55A STREET BROOKLYN, N. Y.

1919

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THE CO-OPERATIVE PRESS

15 SPRUCE ST., NEW YORK

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTES:

1. In this book Trotzky (until near
the end) uses the Russian Calendar in
indicating dates, which, as the reader
will recall, is 13, days behind the Gre-
gorian Calendar, now introduced in
Russia.

2. The abbreviation S. R. and
S. R.'s is often used for "Social-Revo-
lutionist (s^' or "Socialist-Revolu-
tionaries."

3. "Maximalist" often appears in-
stead of "bolshevik," and "minimalist"
instead of "menshevik."

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The Middle-Class Intellectuals in the Revolution

Events move so quickly at this time, that it is hard to set
them down from memory even in chronological sequence.
Neither newspapers nor documents are at our disposal. And
yet the repeated interruptions in the Brest-Litovsk negotia-
tions create a suspense which, under present circumstances,
is' no longer bearable. I shall endeavor, therefore, to recall
the course and the landmarks of the October revolution,
reserving the right to complete and correct this exposition
subsequently in the light of documents.

What characterized our party almost from the very first
period of the revolution, was the conviction that it would
ultimately come into power through the logic of events. I do
not refer to the theorists of the party, who, many years be-
fore the revolution — even before the revolution of 1905 — ^as
a result of their analysis of class relations in Russia, came
to the conclusion that the triumphant development of the
revolution must inevitably transfer the power to the prole-
tariat, supported by the vast masses of the poorest peasants.
The chief basis of this prognosis was the insignificance of
the Russian bourgeois democracy and the concentrate^, char-
acter of Russian industrialism — which makes of the Russian
proletariat a factor of tremendous social importance. The insig-
nificance of' bourgeois democracy is but the complement of
the power and significance of the proletariat. It is true, the
war has deceived many on this point, and, first of all, the
leading groups of bourgeois democracy themselves. The
war has assigned a decisive role in the events of the revolu-
tion to the army. The old army meant the peasantry. Had
the revolution developed more normally — that is, under
peaceful circumstances, as it had in 1912 — the proletariat
would always have held a dominant position, while the
peasant masses would gradually have been taken in tow by
the proletariat and drawn into the whirlpool of the revolution.

But the war produced an altogether different succession
of events. The army welded the peasants together, not by a

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political, but by a military tie. Before the peasant masses
could be drawn together by revolutionary demands and ideas,
they were already organized in regimental staffs, divisions
and army corps. The representatives oif petty bourgeois
democracy, scattered through this army and playing a lead-
ing role in it, both in a military and in a conceptual way,
were almost completely permeated with middle-class revolu-
tionary tendencies. The deep social discontent in the masses
became more acute and was bound to manifest itself, particu-
larly because of the military shipwreck of Czarism. The
proletariat, as represented in its advanced ranks-, began,* as
soon as the revolution developed, to revive the 1905 tradition
and called upon the masses of the people to organize in the
form of representative bodies — Soviets, consisting of deputies.
The army was called upon to send its representatives to the
revolutionary organizations before its political conscience
caught up in any way with the rapid course of the revolution.
Whom could the soldiers send as deputies? Eventually, ,those
representatives of the intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who
chanced to be among them and who possessed the least bit
of knowledge of political affairs and could make this knowl-
edge articulate.. In this way, the petty bourgeois intellectuals
were at once and of necessity raised to great prominence in
the awakening army. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, journal-
ists and volunteers, who under pre-bellum conditions led a
rather retired life and made no claim to any importance,
suddenly found themselves representative of whole corps and
armies and felt that they were "leaders" of the revolution.
The nebulousness of their political ideology fully corresponded
with the formlessness of the revolutionary consciousness of
the masses. These elements were extremely condescending
toward us "Sectarians," for we expressed the social demands of
the workers and the peasants most pointedly and uncom-
promisingly.

At the same time, the petty bourgeois democracy, with
the arrogance of revolutionary upstarts, harbored the deepest
mistrust of itself and of the very masses who had raised it
to such unexpected heights. Calling themselves Socialists,
and considering themselves such, the intellectuals were filled
with an ill-disguised respect for the political power of the
liberal bourgeoisie, towards their knowledge and methods. To

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this was due the effort of the petty bourgeois leaders to secure,
at any cost, a cooperation, union, or coalition with the lib-
eral bourgeoisie. The programme of the Social-Revolu-
tionists — created wholly out of nebulous humanitarian for-
mulas, substituting sentimental generalizations and moral-
istic superstructures for a class-conscious attitude, proved
to be the thing best adapted for a spiritual vestment of this
type of leaders. Their efforts in one way or another to prop
up their spiritual and political helplessness by the science
and politics of the bourgeoisie which so overawed them,
found its theoretical justification in the teachings of the
Mensheviki, who explained that the present revolution was a
bourgeois revolution, and therefore could not succeed with-
out the participation of the bourgeoisie in the government.
In this way, the natural bloc of Social-Revolutionists and
Mensheviki, was created, which gave simultaneous expression
to the political lukewarmness of the middle-class intellectuals
and its relation of vassal to imperialistic liberalism.

It was perfectly clear to us that the logic of the class
struggle would, sooner or later, destroy this temporary com-
bination and cast aside the leaders of the transition period.
The hegemony of the petty bourgeois intellectuals meant, in
reality, that the peasantry, which had suddenly been called,
through the agency of the military machine, to an organized
participation in political life, had, by mere weight of num-
bers, overshadowed the working class and temporarily dis-
lodged it. More than this: To the extent that the middle-
class leaders had suddenly been lifted to terrific heights by
the mere bulk of the army, the proletariat itself, and its ad-
vanced minority, had been discounted, and could not but
acquire a certain political respect for them and a desire to
preserve a political bond with them; it might otherwise be
in danger of losing contact with the peasantry. In the mem-
ories of the older generation of workingmen, the lesson of
1905 was firmly fixed; then, the proletariat was defeated just
because the heavy peasant reserves did not arrive in time for
the decisive battle. This is why in this first period of the
revolution even the masses of workingmen proved so much
more receptive to the political ideology of the Social-Revolu-
tionists and the Mensheviki. All the more so, since the
revolution had awakened the hitherto dormant and backward

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proletarian masses, thus making uninformed intellectual radical-
ism into a preparatory school for them.

The Soviets of Workingmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants'
Deputies meant, under these circumstances, the domination
of peasant formlessness over proletarian socialism, and the
domination of intellectual radicalism over peasant formless-
ness. The soviet institution rose so rapidly, and to such
prominence, largely because the intellectuals, with their tech-
nical knowledge and bourgeois connections, played a leading
part in the work of the soviet. It was clear to us, however,
that the whole inspiring structure was Based upon the deepest
inner contradictions, and that its downfall during the next
phase of the revolution was quite inevitable.

The revolution grew directly out of the war, and the war
became the great test for all parties and revolutionary forces.
The intellectual leaders were "against the war." Many of
them, under the Czarist regime, had considered themselves
partisans of the left wing of the Internationale, and sub-
scribed to the Zimmerwald resolution. But everything
changed suddenly when they found themselves in responsible
"posts." To adhere to the policy of Revolutionary Socialism
meant, under those circumstances, to break with the bour-
geoisie, their own and that of the Allies. And we have already
said that the political helplessness of the intellectual and
semi-intellectual middle class sought shelter for itself in a
union with bourgeois liberalism. This caused the pitiful
and truly shameful attitude of the middle-class leaders to-
wards the war. They confined themselves to sighs, phrases,
secret exhortations or appeals addressed to the Allied Gov-
ernments, while they were actually following the same path
as the liberal bourgeoisie. The masses of soldiers in the
trenches could not, of course, reach the conclusion that the
war, in which they had participated for nearly three years,
had changed its character merely because certain new per-
sons, who called themselves "Social-Revolutionists" or
"Mensheviki," were taking part in the Petrograd Govern-
ment. Milyukov displaced the bureaucrat Pokrovsky;
Tereshtchenko displaced Milyukov — which means that
bureaucratic treachery had been replaced first by militant
Cadet imperialism, then by an unprincipled, nebulous and

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political subserviency; but it brought no objective changes,
and indicated no way out of the terrible war.

Just in this lies the primary cause of the subsequent dis-
organization of the army. TTie agitators told the soldiers
that the Czarist Government had sent them into slaughter
without any rime or reason. But those who replaced the
Czar could not in the least change the character of the
war, just as they could not find their way clear for
a peace campaign. The first months were spent in merely
marking time. This tried the patience both of the army
and of the Allied Governments, and prompted the drive of
June 18, which was demanded by the Allies, who in-
sisted upon the fulfillment of the old Czarist obligations.
Scared by their own helplessness and by the growing im-
patience of the masses, the leaders of the middle class com-
plied with this demand. They* actually began to think that,
in order to obtain peace, it was only necessary fof the Russian
army to make a drive. Such a drive seemed to offer a way
out of the difficult situation, a real solution of the problem —
salvation. It is hard to imagine a more amazing and more
criminal delusion. They spoke of the drive in those days in
the samie terms that were used by the social-patriots of all
countries in the first days and weeks of the war, when speak-
ing of the necessity of supporting the cause of national de-
fence, of strengthening the holy alliance of nations, etc., etc.
All their Zimmerwald internationalistic infatuations had vanished
. as if by magic.

To us, who were in uncompromising opposition, it was
clear that the drive was beset with terrible danger, threaten-
ing perhaps the ruin of the revolution itself. We sounded
the warning that the army, which had been awakened and
deeply stirred by the tumultuous events which it was still far from
comprehending, could not be sent into battle without giving
it new ideas which it could recognize as its own. We warned,
accused, threatened. But as for the dominant party, tied up
as it was with the Allied bourgeoisie, there was no other
course; we were naturally threatened with enmity, with bit-
ter hatred.

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The Campaign Against the Bolsheviki

The future historian will look over the pages of the
Russian newspapers for May and June with considerable
emotion, for it was then that the agitation for the drive was
being carried on. Almost every article, without exception,
in all the governmental and official newspapers, was directed
against the Bolsheviki. There was not an accusation, not a
libel, that was not brought up against us in those days. The
leading role in the campaign was played, of course, by the
Cadet bourgeoisie, who were prompted by their class in-
stincts to the knowledge that jt was not only a question of
a drive, but also of all the further developments of the revolution,
and primarily of the fate of government control. The bour-
geoisie's machinery of "public opinion" revealed itself here
in all its power. All the organs, organizations, publications,
tribunes and pulpits were pressed into the service of a single
common idea : to make the Bolsheviki impossible as a political
party. The concerted effort and the dramatic newspaper
campaign against the Bolsheviki already foreshadowed the
civil war which was to develop during the next stage of the
revolution.

The purpose of the bitterness of this agitation and libel
was to create a total estrangement and irrepressible enmity
between the laboring masses, on the one hand, and the "edu-
cated elements" on the other. The liberal bourgeoisie under-
stood that it could not subdue the masses without the aid
and intercession of the middle-class democracy, which, as
we have already pointed out, proved to be temporarily the
leader of the revolutionary organizations. Therefore, the
immediate object of the political baiting of the Bolsheviki
was to raise irreconcilable enmity between our party and
the vast masses of the "socialistic intellectuals," who, if they
were alienated from the proletariat, could not but come under
the sway of the liberal bourgeoisie.

During the first All-Russian Council of Soviets came the
first alarming peal of thunder, foretelling the terrible events

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that were coming. The party designated the 10th of June
as the day for an armed demonstration at Petrograd. Its
immediate purpose was to influence the All-Russian Council
of Soviets. "Take the power into your own hands" — is what
the Petrograd workingman wanted to say plainly to the
Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. "Sever relations
with the bourgeoisie, give up the idea of coalition, and take
the power into your own hands." To us it was clear that
the break between the Social-Revolutionists and the Men-
sheviki on the one hand, and the liberal bourgeoisie on the
other, would compel the former to seek the support of the
more determined, advanced organization of the proletariat,
which would thus be assured of playing a leading role. And
this is exactly what frightened the middle-class leaders. To-
gether with the Government, in which they had their repre-
sentatives, and hand in hand with the liberal and counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie, they began a furious and insane
campaign against the proposed demonstration, as soon as
they heard of it. All their forces were marshalled against us.
We had an insignificant minority in the Council and with-
drew. The demonstration did not take place.

But this frustrated demonstration left the deepest bitter-
ness in the minds of the two opposing forces, widened the
breach and intensified their hatred. At a secret conference
of the Executive Committee of the Council, in which repre-
sentatives of the minority participated, Tseretelli, then min.
ister of the coalition government, with all the arrogance of
a narrow-minded middle-class doctrinaire, said that the only
danger threatening the revolution was the Bolsheviki and
the Petrograd proletariat armed by them. From this he con-
cluded that it was necessary to disarm the people, who "did
not know how to handle fire-arms." This referred to the
workingmen and to those parts of the Petrograd garrison
who were with our party. However, the disarming did not
take place. For such a sharp measure the political ana
psychological conditions were not yet quite ripe.

To afford the masses some compensation for the demon-
stration they had missed, the Council of Soviets called a
general unarmed demonstration for the 18th of June. But
it was just this very day that marked the political triumph

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of our party. The masses poured into the streets in might}'^
columns; and, despite the fact that they were called out by
the official Soviet organization, to counteract our intended
demonstration of the 10th of June, the workingmen and
soldiers had inscribed on their banners and placards the slo-
gans of our party: *'Down with secret treaties," "Down
with political drives," "Long live a just peace!" "Down
with the ten capitalistic ministers," and "All power to the
Soviets." Of placards expressing confidence in the coalition
government there were but three — one from a cossack regi-
' ment, another from the Plekhanov group, and the third from
the Petrograd organization of the Bund, composed mostly
of non-proletarian elements. This demonstration showed not
only to our enemies, but also to ourselves as well that we were
much stronger in Petrograd than was generally supposed.

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The Drive of June 18th

A governmental crisis, as a result of the demonstration
by these revolutionary bodies, appeared absolutely inevitable.
But the impression produced by the demonstration was lost
as soon as it was reported from the front that the revolu-
tionary army had advanced to attack the enemy. On the
very day that the workingmen and the Petrograd garrison de
manded the publication of the secret treaties and an open offer of
peace, Kerensky flung the revolutionary troops into battle. This
was no mere coincidence, to be sure. The projectors had every-
thing prepared in advance, and the time of attack was determined
not by military but by political considerations.

On the 19th of June, there was a so-called patriotic demon-
stration in the streets of Petrograd. The Nevsky Prospect,
the chief artery of the bourgeoisie, was studded with excited
groups, in which army officers, journalists and well-dressed
ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign against the Bolshe-
viki. The first reports of the military drive were favorable.
The leading liberal papers considered that the principal aim
had been attained, that the drive of June 18, regardless of
its ultimate military results, would deal a mortd blow to
the revolution, restore the army's former discipline, and as-
sure the liberal bourgeoisie of a commanding position in the
aflfairs of the government.

We, however, indicated to the bourgeoisie a different line
of future events. In a special declaration which we made
in the Soviet Council a few days before the drive, we declared
that 'the military advance would inevitably destroy all the
internal ties within the army, set up its various parts one
against the other and turn the scales heavily in favor of
the counter-revolutionary elements, since it would be im-
possible to maintain discipline in a demoralized army — an
army devoid of controlling ideas — without recourse to severe
repressive measures. In other words, we foretold in this
declaration those results which later came to be known col-
lectively under the name of "Kornilovism." We believed

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that the greatest danger threatened the revolution in either
case — whether the drive proved successful, which we did not
expect, or met with failure, which seemed to us almost in-
evitable. A successful military advance would have united
the middle class and the bourgeoisie in their common chau-
vinistic tendencies, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat.
An unsuccessful drive was likely to demoralize the army
completely, to involve a general retreat and the loss of much
additional territory, and to bring disgust and disappoint-
ment to the people. Events took the latter course. The
news of victory did not last long. It was soon replaced by
gloomy reports of the refusal of many regiments to support
the advancing columns, of the great losses in commanding
officers, who sometimes composed the whole of the attack-
ing units, etc. * In view of its great historical significance, we
append an extract from the document issued by our partv
in the All-Russian Council of Soviets on the 3rd of June, 1917,
just two weeks before the drive.

"We deem it necessary to present, j^s the first order of the day, a
question on whose solution depend not only all the other measures
to be adopted by the Council, but actually and literally the fate of the
whole Russian revolution — the question of the military drive which is
being planned for the immediate future.

"Having put the people and the army, which does not know in the
name of what international ends it is called upon to shed its blood,
face to face with the impending attack (with all its consequences),
the counter-revolutionary circles of Russia are counting on the fact
that this drive will necessitate a concentration of power in the hands
of the military, diplomatic, and capitalistic groups affiliated with
English, French and American imperialism, and thus free them from
the necessity of reckoning later with the organized will of Russian
democracy.

"The secret counter-revolutionary instigators of the drive, who
do not stop short even of military adventurism, are consciously trying
to play on the demoralization in the army, brought about by the
internal and international situation of the country, and to this end are
inspiring the discouraged elements with the fallacious idea that the
very fact of a drive can rehabilitate the army — and by this mechanical
means hide the lack of a definite program for liquidating the war.
At the same time, it is clear that such an advance cannot but com-
pletely disorganize the army by setting up its various units one
against the other."

The military events were developing amid ever- increasing

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difficulties in the internal life of the nation. With regard to
the land question, industrial life, and national relations, the
coalition government did not take a single resolute step for-
ward. The food and transportation situations were becom-
ing more and more disorganized. Local clashes were grow-
ing more frequent. The "Socialistic" ministers were exhort-
ing the masses to be patient.. All decisions and measures,
including the calling of the Constituent Assembly, were be-
ing postponed. The insolvency and the instability of the
coalition regime were obvious.

There were two possible ways out: to drive the bour-
geoisie out of power and promote the aims of the revolution,
or to adopt the policy of "bridling" the people by resorting
to repressive measures. Kerensky and Tseretelli clung to
a middle course and only muddled matters the more. When
the Cadets, the wiser and more far-sighted leaders of the
coalition government, understood that the unsuccessful mili-
tary advance of June 18th might deal a blow not only to the
revolution, but also to the government temporarily, they threw
the whole weight of responsibility upon their allies to the
left.

On the 2nd of July came a crisis in the ministry, the
immediate cause of which was the Ukrainian question.

This was in every respect a period of most intense
political suspense. From various points at the front came
delegates and private individuals, telling of the chaos which
reigned in the army as a result of the advance. The so-
called government press demanded severe repressions. Such
demands frequently came from the so-called Socialistic
papers, also Kerensky, more and more openly, went over to
the side of the Cadets and the Cadet generals, who had mani-
fested not only their hatred of revolution, but also their bitter
enmity toward revolutionary parties in general. The allied
ambassadors were pressing the government with the demand
that army discipline be restored and the advance continued.
The greatest panic prevailed in government circles, while
among the workingmen much discontent had accumulated,
which craved for outward expression. "Avail yourselves of
the resignations of the Cadet ministers and take all the power
into your own hands!" was the call addressed by the work-

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ingmen of Petrograd to the Socialist-Revolutionists and
Mensheviki in control of the Soviet parties.

I recall the session of the Executive Committee which
was held on the 2nd of July. The Soviet ministers came
to report a new crisis in the government. We were intensely
interested to learn what position they would take now that
they had actually gone to jpieces under the great ordeals
arising from coalition policies. Their spokesman was Tsere-
telli. He nonchalantly explained to the Executive Committee
that those concessions which he and Tereshchenko had made
to the Kiev Rada did not by any means signify a dismember-
ment of the country, and that this, therefore, did not g^ve
the Cadets any good reason for leaving the Ministry. Tsere-
telli accused the Cadet leaders of practising a centralistic
doctrinairism, of failing to understand the necessity for com-
promising with the Ukrainians, etc., etc. The total impres-
sion was pitiful in the extreme: the hopeless doctrinaire of
the coalition government was hurling the charge of doctrinairism
against the crafty capitalist politicians who seized upon the first
suitable excuse for compelling their political clerks to repent of
the decisive turn they had given to the course of events by the
military advance of June 18th.

After all the preceding experience of the coalition, there
would seem to be but one way out of the difficulty — to break
with the Cadets and set up a Soviet government. The rela-
tive forced within the Soviets were such at the time that the
Soviet's power as a political party would fall naturally into
the hands of the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki.
We deliberately faced the situation. Thanks to the possibility of
reelections at any time, the mechanism of the Soviets assured a
sufficiently exact reflection of the progressive shift toward the
left in the masses of workers and soldiers. After the break of
the coalition with the bourgeoisie, the radical tendencies should,
we expected, receive a greater following in the Soviet organiza-
tions. Under such circumstances, the proletariat's struggle for
power would naturally move in the channel of Soviet organiza-
tions and could take a more normal course. Having broken with
the bourgeoisie, the middle-class democracy would itself fall
under their ban and would be compelled to seek a closer union
Vvith the Socialistic proletariat. In this way the indecisive-
ness and political indefiniteness of the middle-class demo-

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cratic elements would be overcome sooner or later by the
working masses, with the help of our criticism. This is the
reason why we demanded that the leading Soviet parties, in
which we had no real confidence (and we frankly said so),
should take the governing power into their own hands.

But even after the ministerial crisis of the 2nd of July,
Tseretelli and his adherents did not abandon the coalition
idea. They explained in the Executive Committee that the
leading Cadets were, indeed, demoralized by doctrinairism
and even by counter-revolutionism, but that in the provinces
there were still many bourgeois elements which could still
go hand in hand with the revolutionary democrats, and that
in order to make sure of their co-operation it was necessary
to attract representatives of the bourgeoisie into the mem-
bership of the new ministry. Dan already entertained hopes
of a radical-democratic party to be hastily built up, at the
time, by a few pro-democratic politicians. The report that
the coalition government had been broken up, only to be re-
placed by a new coalition, spread rapidly through Petrograd
and provoked a storm of indignation among the workingmen
and soldiers everywhere. Thus the events of July 3rd-5th were
produced.

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The July Days

Already during the session of the Executive Committee
we were informed by telephone that a regiment of machine-
gunners was making ready for attack. By telephone, too,
we adopted measures to check these preparations, but the
ferment was working among the people. Representatives of
military units that had been disciplined for insubordination
brought alarming news from the front, of repressions which
aroused the garrison. Among the Petrograd workingmen
the displeasure with the official leaders was intensified also
by the fact that Tseretelli, Dan and Cheidze misrepresented
the general views of the proletariat in their endeavor to
prevent the Petrograd Soviet from becoming the mouthpiece
of the new tendencies of the toilers. The All-Russian
Executive Committee, formed in the July Council and de-
pending upon the more backward provinces, put the Petro-
grad Soviet more and more into the background and took all
matters into its own hands, including even local Petrograd
aifairs.

A clash was inevitable. The workers and soldiers pressed
from 'below, vehemently voiced their discontent with the
official Soviet policies and demanded greater resolution from
our party. We considered that, in view of the backwardness
of the provinces, the time for. such a course had not yet
arrived. At the same time, we feared that the events taking
place at the front might bring extreme chaos into the revo-
lutionary ranks, and desperation to the hearts of the people.
The attitude of our party toward the movement of July 3rd-5th
was quite well defined. On the one hand, there was the
danger that Petrograd might break away from the more
backward parts of the country ; while on the other, there was
the feeling that only the active and energetic intervention of
Petrograd could save the day. The party agitators who
worked among the people were working in harmony with
the masses, conducting an uncompromising campaign.

There was still some hope that the demonstration of the
revolutionary masses in the streets might destroy the blind
doctrinairism of the coalitionists and make them understand
that they could retain their power only by breaking openly
with the bourgeoisie. Despite all that had recently been said

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and written in the bourgeois press, our party had no inten-
tion whatever of seizing power by means of an armed revolt.
In point of fact, the revolutionary demonstration started
spontaneously, and was guided by us only in a political way.

The Central Executive Committee was holding its session
in the Taurida Palace, when turbulent crowds of armed sol-
'diers and workmen surrounded it from all sides. Among them
was, of course, an insignificant number of anarchistic ele-
ments, which were ready to use their arms against the Soviet
center. There were also some "pogrom" elements, black-
hundred elements, and obviously mercenary elements, seeking
to utilize the occasion for instigating pogroms and chaos.
From among the sundry elements came the demands for the
arrest of Chernoff and Tseretelli, for the dispersal of the
Executive Committee, etc. An attempt was even made to
arrest Chernoff. Subsequently, at Kresty, I identified one of
the sailors who had participated in this attempt; he was a
criminal, imprisoned at Kresty for robbery. But the bour-
geois and the coalitionist press represented this movement
as a pogromist, counter-revolutionary affair, and, at the same
time, as a Bolshevist crusade, the immediate object of which
was to seize the* reins of Government by the use of armed
force against the Central Executive Committee.

The movement of July 3rd-5th had already disclosed with per-
fect clearness that a complete impotence reigned within the
ruling Soviet parties at Petrograd. The garrison was far from
being all on our side. There were still some wavering, un-
decided, passive elements. But if we should ignore the
junkers, there were no regiments at all which were ready to
fight us in the defense of the Government or the leading So-
viet parties. It was necessary to summon troops from the
front. The entire strategy of Tseretelli, Chernoff, and others
on the 3rd of July resolved itself into this: to gain time in
order to give Kerensky an opportunity to bring up his "loyal"
regiments. One deputation after another entered the hall
of the Taurida Palace, which was surrounded by armed
crowds, and demanded a complete separation from the
bourgeoisie, positive social reforms, and the opening of peace
negotiations.

We, the Bolsheviki, met every new company of dis-
gruntled troops gathered in the yards and streets, with

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speeches, in which we called upon them to be calm and
assured them that, in view of the present temper of the people,
the coalitionists could not succeed in forming a new coalition.
Especially pronounced was the temper of the Kronstadt
sailorSj whom we had' to restrain from transcending the limits
of a peaceful demonstration. The fourth demonstration, which
was already controlled by our party, assumed a still more
serious character. The Soviet leaders were quite at sea ; their
speeches assumed an evasive character; the answers given
by Cheidze to the deputies were without any political con-
tent. It was clear that the official leaders were marking time.

On the night of the 4th the "loyal" regiments began to
arrive. During the session of the Executive Committee the
Taurida Palace resounded to the strains of the Marseillaise.
The expression on the faces of the leaders suddenly changed.
They displayed a look of confidence which had been entirely
wanting of late. It was produced by the entry into the Tau-
rida Palace of the Volynsk regiment, the same one, which,
a few months later, was to lead the vanguard of the October
revolution, under our banners. From this moment, every-
thing changed. There was no longer any need to handle the
delegates of the Pettograd workmen and soldiers with kid
gloves. Speeches were made from the floor of the Executive
Committe, which referred to an armed insurrection that had
been "suppressed'* on that very day by loyal revolutionary
forces. The Bolsheviki were declared to be a counter-revo-
lutionary party.

The fear experienced by the liberal bourgeoisie during the
Jwo days of armed demonstration betrayed itself in a hatred
that was crystallized not only in the columns of the news-
papers, but also in the streets of Petrograd, and more espe-
cially on the Nevsky Prospect, where individual workmen
and soldiers caught in the act of "criminal" agitation were
mercilessly beaten up. The junkers, army-officers, policemen,
and the St. Georgian cavaliers were now the masters of the
situation. And all these were headed by the savage counter-
revolutionists. The workers' organizations and establish-
ments of our party were being ruthlessly crushed and demol-
ished. Arrests, searches, assaults and even murders came to be
common occurrences. . On the night of the 4th the then At-
torney-General, Pereverzev, handed over to the press "docu-

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ments" which were intended to prove that the Bolshevist party
was headed by bribed agents of Germany.

The leaders of the Social-Revolutionist and Menshevik
parties have known us too long and too well to believe these
accusations. At the same time, they were too deeply inter-
ested in their success to repudiate them publicly. And even
now one cannot recall without disgust that saturnalia of lies
which was celebrated broadcast in all the bourgeois and coa-
lition newspapers. Our organs were suppressed. Revolution-
ary Petrograd felt that the provinces and the army were still
far from being with it. In workingmen's sections of the city
a short period of tyrannical infringements set in, while in
the garrison repressive measures were introduced against the
disorganized regiments, and certain of its units were dis-
armed. At the same time, the political leaders manufactured
a new ministry, with the inclusion of representatives of third-
rate bourgeois groups, which, although adding nothing to
the government, robbed it of its last vestige of revolutionary
initiative.

Meanwhile events at the front ran their own course. The
organic unity of the army was shaken to its very depths. The
soldiers were becoming convinced that the great majority of
the officers, who, at the beginning of the revolution, bedaubec
themselves with red revolutionary paint, were still very inim-
ical to the new regime. An open selection of counter-revolu-
tionary elements was being made in the lines. Bolshevik
publications were ruthlessly persecuted. The military ad-
vance had long ago changed into a tragic retreat. The bour-
geois press mad4y libelled the army. Whereas, on the eve of
the advance, the ruling parties told us that we were an in-
significant gang and that the army had never heard of us and
would not have anything to do with us, now, when the
gamble of the drive had ended so disastrously, these same
persons *and parties laid the whole blame for its failure on
our shoulders. The prisons were crowded with revolutionary
workers and soldiers. All the old legal bloodhounds of
Czarism were employed in investigating the July 3-5 affair.
Under these circumstances, the Social-Revolutionsts and the
Mensheviki went so far as to demand that Lenin, Zinoviev
and others of their group should surrender themselves to. the
"Courts of Justice."

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The Events Following the July Days

The infringements of liberty in the workingmen's quar-
ters lasted but a little while and were followed by accessions of
revolutionary spirit, not only among the proletariat, but also
in the Petrograd garrison. The coalitionists were losing all
influence. The wave of Bolshevism began to spread from the
urban centers to every part of the country and, despite all
obstacles, penetrated into the army ranks. The new coalition
government, with Kerensky at its head, had already openly
embarked upon a policy of repression. The ministry had re-
stored the death penalty in the army. Our papers were sup-
pressed and our agitators w^ere arrested; but this only in-
creased our influence. In spite of all the obstacles involved
in the new elections for the Petrograd Soviet, the distribution
of power in it had become so changed that on certain impor-
tant questions we already commanded a majority vote. The
same was the case m the Moscow Soviet.

At that time I, together with many others, was imprisoned
at Kresty, having been arrested for instigating and organiz-
ing the armed revolt of July 3-5, in collusion with the German
authorities, and with the object of furthering the military
ends of the HohenzoUerns. The famous prosecutor of the
Czarist regime, Aleksandrov, who had prosecuted numerous
revolutionists, was now entrusted with the task of protect-
ing the public from the counter-revolutionary Bolsheviki.
Under the old regime the inmates of prisons used to be
divided into political prisoners and criminals. Now a new
terminology was established: Criminals and Bolsheviks,
Great perplexity reigned among the imprisoned soldiers.
The boys came from the country and had previously taken
no part in political, life. They thought that the revolution
had set them free, once and for all. Hence they viewed
with amazement their doorlocks and grated windows. While
taking their exercise in the prison-yard, they would always
ask me what all this meant ^md how it would end. I com-
forted them with the hope of our ultimate victory.

Toward the end of August occurred the revolt of Komi-

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loff; this was the immediate result of the mobilization of
the counter-revolutionary forces to which a forceful impulse
had been imparted by the attack of July 18th. At the
celebrated Moscow Congress, which took place in the middle
01 August, Kerensky attempted to take a middle ground be-
tween the propertied elements and the democracy of the
small bourgeoisie. The Maximalists were on the whole con-
sidered as standing beyond the bounds of the "legal."
Kerensky threatened them with blood and iron, which met
with vehement applause from the propertied half of the gath-
ering, and treacherous silence on the part of the bourgeois
democracy. But the hysterical outcries and threats of
Kerensky did not satisfy the chiefs of the counter-revolu-
tionary interests. They had only too clearly observed the
revolutionary tide flooding ejvery portion of the country,
among the working class, in the villages, in the army; and
they considered it imperative to adopt without any delay
the most extreme measures to curb the masses. After reach-
ing an understanding with the property-owning bourgeoisie
— who saw in him their hero — Korniloff took it upon him-
self to accomplish this hazardous task. Kerensky, Savinkoff,
Filonenko and other Socialist-Revolutionists of the govern-
ment or semi-government class participated in this conspir-
acy, but each and every one of them at a certain stage of
the altering circumstances betrayed Korniloff, for they knew
that in the case of his defeat, they would turn out to have
been on the wrong side of the fence. We lived through the
events connected with Korniloff, while we were in jail, and
followed them in the newspapers; the unhindered delivery
of newspapers was the only important respect in which the
jails of Kerensky differed from those of the old regime. The
Cossack General's adventure miscarried ; six months of revo-
lution had created in the consciousness of the masses and in
their organization a sufficient resistance against an open
counter-revolutionary attack. The conciliable Soviet parties were
terribly frightened at the prospect of the possible results of
the Korniloff conspiracy, which threatened to sweep away,
not only the Maximalists, but also the whole revolution,
together with its governing parties. The Social-Revolu-
tionists and the Minimalists proceeded to legalize the Max-
imalists — this, to be sure, only retrospectively and only half-

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way, inasmuch as they scented possible dangers in the future.
The very same Kronstadt sailors — whom they had dubbed
burglars and counter-revolutionists in the days following
the July uprising — were summoned during the Korniloff dan-
ger to Petrograd for the defence of the revolution. They
came without a murmur, without a word of reproach, with-
out recalling the past, and occupied the most responsible
posts.

I had the fullest right to recall to Tseretelli these words
which I had addressed to him in May, when he was occupied
in persecuting the Kronstadt sailors : "When a counter-
revolutionary general attempts to throw the noose around
the necki of the revolution, the Cadets will grease the rope
with soap, while the Kronstadt sailors will come to fight and die
together with us."

The Soviet organizations had revealed everywhere, in
the rear and at the front, their vitality and their power in
the struggle with the Korniloff uprising. In almost no in-
stance did things ever come to a military conflict. The revo-
lutionary masses ground into nothingness the general's con-
spiracy. Just as the moderates in July found no soldiers
among the Petrograd garrison to fight against us, so now
Korniloff found no soldiers on the whole front to fight
against the revolution. He had acted by virtue of a delusion
and the words of our propaganda easily destroyed his de-
signs.

According to information in the newspapers, I had ex-
pected a more rapid unfolding of subsequent events in the
direction of the passing of the power into the hands of the
Soviets. The growth of the influence and power of the
Maximalists became indubitable and had gained an irresist-
able momentum. The Maximalists had warned against the
coalition, against the attack of the 18th of July, they pre-
dicted the Korniloff affair — ^the masses of the people became
convinced by experience that we were right. Diiring the
most terrifying moments of the Korniloff conspiracy, when
the Caucasian division was approaching Petrograd, the
Petrograd Soviet was arming the workingmen with the ex-
torted consent of the authorities. Army divisions which had
been brought up against us had long since achieved their

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successful rebirth in the stimulating atmosphere of Petro-
grad and were now altogether on our side. The Komiloflf
uprising was destined to open definitely the eyes of the army
to the inadmissibility of any continued policy of conciliation
with the bourgeois counter-revolution. Hence it was possi-
ble to expect that the crushing of the Komiloff uprising
would prove to be only an introduction to an immediate
aggressive action on the part of the revolutionary forces
under the leadership of our party for the purpose of seizing
sole power. But events unfolded more slowly. With all
the tension of their revolutionary feeling, the masses had
become more cautious after the bitter lesson of the July
days, and renounced all isolated demonstrations, awaiting a
direct instruction and direction from above. And, also,
among the leadership of our party there developed a "watch-
ful-waiting" policy. Under these circumstances, the liquida-
tion of the Korniloff adventure, irrespective of the profound
regrouping of forces to our advantage, did not bring about
any immediate political changes.

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The Conflict with the Soviets

In the Petrograd Soviet, the domination of our party
was definitely strengthened from that time on. This was
evidenced in dramatic fashion when the question of the per-
sonnel of its presiding body came up. At that epoch, when
the Social-Revolutionists and the Minimalists were hold-
ing sway in the Soviets, they isolated the Maximalists by
every means in their power. They did not admit even one
Maximalist into the membership of the Executive Committee
at Petrograd, even when our party represented at least one-
third of all the Soviet members. Afterwards, when the
Petrograd Soviet, by a dwindling majority, passed the reso-
lution for the transfering of all power into the hands of the
Soviet, our party put forth the demand to establish a coali-
tion Executive Committee formed on a proportional basis.
The old presiding body, the members of which were Cheidze,
Tseretelli, Kerensky, Skobeloff, Chernoff, flatly refused
this demand. It may not be out of place to mention
this here, inasmuch as representatives of the parties broken
up by the revolution speak of the necessity of presenting
one front for the sake of democracy* and accuse us of separat-
ism. There was called at that time a special meeting of the
Petrograd Soviet, which was to decide the question of the
presiding body's fate. All forces, -all reserves had been mo-
bilized on both sides. Tseretelli came out with a speech
embodying a programme, wherein he pointed out that the
question of the presiding body was a question of orientation.
We reckoned that we would sway somewhat less than half
of the vote and were ready to consider that a sign of our
progress. Actuallv, however, the vote showed that we had
a majority of nearly one hundred. "For six months," said
Tseretelli at that time, "we have stood at the head of the
Petrograd Soviet and led it from victory to victory; we wish
that you may hold for at least half of that time the positions
which you are now preparing to occupy." In the Moscow
Soviet a similar change of leadership among the parties took
place^

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One after the other the Provincial Soviets joined the
Bolshevik position. The date of convoking the Second All-
Russian Congress of Soviets was approaching. But the
leading group of the Central Executive Committee was striv-
ing with all its might to put off the Congress to an indefinite
future time, in order thus to destroy it in advance. It was
evident that the new Congress of Soviets would give our
party a majority, would correspondingly alter the make-up
of the Central Executive Committee, and deprive the fusion-
ists of their most important position. The struggle for the
convocation of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets assumed
the greatest importance for us.

To counterbalance this, the Mensheviks (Minimalists)
and the Social-Revolutionists put forth the Democratic Confer-
ence idea. They needed this move against both us and Kerensky.

By this time the head of the Ministry assumed an abso-*
lutely independent and irresponsible position. He had been
raised to power by the Petrograd Soviet during the first
epoch of the revolution: Kerensky had entered the Ministry
without a preliminary decision of the Soviets, but his admis-
sion was subsequently approved. After the First Congress
of Soviets, the Socialist ministers were held accountable to
the Central Executive Committee. Their allies, the Cadets
(Constitutional Democrats) were responsible only to their
party. To meet the bourgeoisie's wishes, the General Execu-
tive Committee, after the July days, released the Socialist
Ministers from all responsibility to the Soviets, in order, as
it were, to create a revolutionary dictatorship. It is rather
well to mention this, too, now that the same persons who
built up the dictatorship of a coterie, come forth with accusa-
tions and imprecations against the dictatorship of a class.
The Moscow Conference, at which the skilfully manipulated
professional and democratic elements balanced each other,
aimed to strengthen Kerensky's power over classes and par-
ties. This aim was attained only in appearance. In reality,
the Moscow Conference revealed Kerensky's utter impotence,
for he was equally remote from both the professional elements
and the bourgeois democracy. But since the liberals and
conservatives applauded his onslaughts against democracy,
.and the fusionists gave him ovations when he cautiously up-
braided the counter-revolutionaries, the impression was

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growing upon him that he was supported, as it were, by both
the former and the latter, and, accordingly, commanded un-
limited power. Over workingmen and revolutionary soldiers
he held the threat of blood and iron. His policy continued
the bargaining with Korniloff behind the scenes — a bargaining
which compromised him even in the fusionists* eyes: in
evasively diplomatic terms, so ^characteristic of him, Tsere-
telli spoke of "personal" movements in politics and of the
necessity of curbing these personal movements. This task
was to be accomplished by the Democratic Conference, which
was called, according to arbitrary forms, from among repre-
sentatives of Soviets, dumas, zemstvos, professional trade
unions and co-operative societies. Still, the main task was
to secure a sufficiently conservative -composition of the Con-
ference, to dissolve the Soviets once for all in the formless
mass of democracy, and, on the new organizational basis, to
gain a firm footing against the Bolshevik tide.

Here it will not be out of place to note, in a few words,
the difference between the political role of the Soviets and
that of the democratic organs of. self-government. More
than once, the Philistines called our attention to the fact
that the new dumas and zemstvos elected on the basis of
universal suffrage, were incomparably more democratic than
the Soviets and were more suited to represent the population.
However, this formal democratic criterion is devoid of seri-
ous content in a revolutionary epoch. The significance of
the Revolution lies in the rapid changing of the judgment of
the masses, in the fact that new and ever new strata of
population acquire experience, verify their views of the day
before, sweep them aside, work out new ones, desert old
leaders and follow new ones in the forward march. During
revolutionary times, formally democratic organizations, based
upon the ponderous apparatus of universal suffrage, inevit-
ably fall behind the development of the political consciousness
of the masses. Quite different are the Soviets. They rely
immediately upon organic groupings, such as shop, mill,
factory, volost, regiment, etc. To be sure, there are guaran-
tees, just as legal, of the strictness of elections, as are used
in creating democratic dumas and zemstvos. But there are
in the Sbviet incomparably more* serious, more profbund
guarantees of the direct and immediate relation between the

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deputy and the electors. A town-duma or zemstvo member
is supported by the amorphous mass of electors, which* en-
trusts its full powers to him for a year and then breaks up.
The Soviet electors remain always united by the conditions
of their work and their existence; the deputy is ever before
their eyes, at any moment they can prepare a mandate to
him, censure him, recall or replace him with another person.

If during the revolutionary month preceding the general
political evolution expressed itself in the fact that the in-
fluence of the fusionist parties was being replaced by a de-
cisive influence of the Bolsheviki, it is quite plain that this
process found its most striking and fullest expression in the
Soviets, while the dumas and zemstvos, notwithstanding all
their formal democratism, expressed yesterday's status of
the popular masses and not to-day's. This is exactly what
explains the gravitation toward dumas and zemstvos on the
part of those parties which were losing more and more
ground in the esteem of the revolutions^ry class. We shall
meet wi^ the same question, only on a larger scale, later,
when we come to the Constituent Assembly.

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The Democratic Conference

The Democratic Conference, called by Tseretelli and his
fellow-combatants in mid-September, was' totally artificial in
character, representing as it did a combination of Soviets
and organs of self-government in a ratio calculated to secure
a preponderance of the fusionist parties. Born of helpless-
ness and confusion, the Conference ended in a pitiful fiasco.
The professional bourgeoisie treated the Conference with the
greatest hostility, beholding in it an endeavor to push the
bourgeoisie away from the positions it had approached at
the Moscow Conference. The revolutionary proletariat, and
the masses of soldiers and peasants connected with it, con-
demned in advance the fraudulent method of calling together
the Democratic Conference. The immediate; task of the fu-
sionists was to create a responsible ministry. But even this
was not achieved. Kerensky neither wanted nor permitted
responsibility, because this was not permitted by the bour-
geoisie, which was backing him. Irresponsibility towards
the organs of the so-called democracy meant, in fact, respon-
sibility to the Cadets and the Allied Embassies. For the
time being this was sufficient for the bourgeoisie. On the
question of coalition the Democratic Conference revealed its
utter insolvency: the votes in favor of a coalition with the
bourgeoisie slightly outnumbered those against the coalition ;
the majority voted against a coalition with the Cadets. But
with the Cadets left out, there proved to be, among the bour-
geoisie, no serious counter-agencies for the coalition. Tsere-
telli explained this in detail to the conference. If the con-
ference did not grasp it, so much the worse for the confer-
ence. Behind the backs of the conference, negotiations were
carried on without concealment with the Cadets, whom they
had repudiated, and it was decided that the Cadets should
not appear as Cadets, but as "Social workers." Pressed
hard on both right and left, the bourgeois democracy tolerated
all this dickering, and thereby demonstrated its utter political
prostration.

From the Democratic Conference a Soviet was picked, and
it was decided to complete it by adding representatives of
the professional elements; this Pre-Parliament was to fill the

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vacant period before the convocation of the Constituent As-
sembly. Contrary to Tseretelli's original plan, but in full
accord with the plans of the bourgeoisie, the new coalition
ministry retained its formal independence with regard to the
Pre-Parliament. Everything together produced fiie impres-
sion of a pitiful and impotent creation of an office clerk
behind which was concealed the complete capitulation of
the petty bourgeois democracy before the professional liberalism
which, a month previously, had openly supported Korniloff's
attack on the Revolution. The sum total of the whole affair
was, therefore, the restoration and perpetuation of the coalition
with the liberal bourgeoisie. No longer could there be any
doubt that quite independently of the make-up of the future
Constituent Assembly, the governmental power would, in
fact, be held by the bourgeoisie, as despite all the pre-
ponderance given them by the masses of the people the
fusionist parties invariably arrived at a coalition with the
Cadets, deeming it impossible, as they did, to create a state
power without the bourgeoisie. Tlie attitude of the masses
toward Milyukov's party was one of the deepest hostility.
At all elections during the revolutionary period, the Cadets
suffered merciless defeat, and yet, the very parties — i. e., the
Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviks — which victoriously
defeated the Cadet party at the elections, after election
gave it the place of honor in the coalition government. It is
natural that the masses realized more and more that in reality the
fusionist parties were playing the role of stewards to the
liberal bourgeoisie.

Meantime,, the internal situation was becoming more and
more complicated and unfavorable. The war dragged on
aimlessly, senselessly and interminably. The Government
took no steps whatever to extricate itself from the vicious
circle. The laughable scheme was proposed of sending the
Menshevik Skobeloff to Paris to influence the allied imperial-
ists. But no sane man attached any importance to this
scheme. Korniloff gave up Riga to the Germans in order
to terrorize public opinion, and having brought about this
condition, to establish the discipline of the knout in the army.
Danger threatened Petrograd. And the bourgeois elements
greeted this peril with unconcealed malicious joy. The for-
mer President of the Duma, Rodzyanko, openly said again

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and again that the surrender of debauched Petrograd to the
Germans would not be a great misfortune. For illustration
he cited Riga, where the Deputy Soviets had been done away
with after the coming of the Germans, and firm order, to-
gether with the old police system, had been established.

Would the Baltic fleet be lost? But the fleet had been
debauched by the Revolutionary propaganda; ergo the loss
was not so great. The cynicism of a garrulous nobleman
expressed the hidden thoughts of the greater part of the
bourgeoisie, that to surrender Petrograd to the Germans did
not mean to lose it. Under the peace treaty it would be re-
stored, but restored ravaged by German militarism. By that
time the revolution would be decapitated, and it would be
easier to manage. Kerensky's government did not think of
seriously defending the capital. On the contrary, public
opinion was being prepared for its possible surrender.
Public institutions were being removed from Petrograd to
Moscow and other cities.

In this setting, the Soldiers' section of the Petrograd
Soviet had its meeting. Feeling was tense and turbulent.
Was the Government incapable of defending Petrograd? If
so, let it make peace. And if incapable of making peace, let it
clear out. The frame of mind of the Soldiers' section found ex-
pression in this resolution. This was already the heat-lightning
of the October Revolution.

At the front, the situation grew worse day by day. Chilly
autumn, with its rains and winds, was drawing nigh. And
there was looming up a fourth winter campaign. Supplies
deteriorated every day. In the rear, the front had been for-
gotten — no reliefs, no new contingents, no warm winter
clothing, which was indispensable. Desertions grew in num-
ber. The old army committees, elected in the first period
of the Revolution, remained at their places and supported
Kerensky's policy. Re-elections were forbidden. An abyss
sprang up between the committees and the soldier masses.
Finally the soldiers began to regard the committees with
hatred. With increasing frequency delegates from the
trenches were arriving in Petrograd and at the sessions of
the Petrograd Soviet put the question point blank: "What
is to be done further? By whom and how will the war be
ended? Why is the Petrograd Soviet silent?"^

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Inevitability of the Struggle for Power

The Petrograd Soviet was not silent. It demanded the im-
mediate transfer of all power into the hands of the Soviets in
the capitals and in the provinces, the immediate transfer of
the land to the peasants, the workingmen's control of production,
and immediate opening of peace negotiations. So long as we
remained an opposition party, the motto — all power to the So-
viets — ^was a propaganda motto. But as soon as we found our-
selves in the majority in all the principal Soviets, this motto
imposed upon us the duty of a direct and immediate fight for
power.

In the country villages, the situation had grown entangled
and complicated in the extreme. The Revolution had promised
land to the peasant, but at the same time, the leading parties
demanded that the peasant should not touch this land until the
Constituent Assembly should meet. At first the peasants waited
patiently, but when they began to lose patience, the coalition
ministry showered repressive measures upon them. Meanwhile
the Constituent Assembly was receding to ever remoter distances.
The bourgeoisie insisted upon calling the Constituent Assembly
after the conclusion of peace. The peasant masses were growing
more and more impatient. What we had foretold at the very
beginning of the Revolution, was being realized: the peasants
were seizing the land of their own accord. Repressive measures
grew, arrests of revolutionary land committees began. In cer-
tain uyezds (districts) Kerensky introduced martial law. A line
of delegates, who came on foot, flowed from the villages to the
Petrograd Soviet. They complained that they had been arrested
when they attempted to carry out the Petrograd Soviet's pro-
gramme and to transfer the estate holder's land into the hands
of the peasant committees. The peasants demanded protection
of us. We replied that we should be in a position to protect
them only if the power were in our hands. From this, however,
it followed that the Soviets must seize the power if they did not
wish to become mere debating societies.

"It is senseless to fight for the power of the Soviets six or
eight weeks before the Constituent Assembly," our neighbors

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on the Right told us. We, however, were in no degree infected
with this fetish worship of the Constituent Assembly. In the
first place, there were no guarantees that it really would be called.
The breaking up of the army, mass desertions, disorganization
of the supplies department, agrarian revolution — all this created
an environment which was unfavorable to the elections for the
Constituent Assembly. The surrender of Petrograd to the Ger-
mans, furthermore, threatened to remove altogether the question
of elections from the order of the day. And, besides, even if it
were called according to the old registration lists under the
leadership of the old parties, the Constituent Assembly
would be but a cover and a sanction for the coali-
tion power. Without the bourgeoisie neither the S. R.*s
nor the Mensheviks were in a position to assume power.
Only the revolutionary class was destined to break the
vicious circle wherein the Revolution was revolving and go-
ing to pieces. The power had to be snatched from the hands
of the elements which were directly or indirectly serving the
bourgeoisie and making use of the state apparatus as a tool of
obstruction against the revolutionary demands of the people.

All power to the Soviets ! demanded our party. Translated into
party language, this had meant, in the preceding period, the
power of the S. R.'s and Mensheviks, as opposed to a coalition
with the liberal bourgeoisie. Now, in October 1917, the same,
motto meant handing over all power to the revolutionary pro-
letariat, at the head of which, at this period, stood the Bolshevik
party. It was a question of the dictatorship of the working class,
which was leading, or, more correctly, was capable of leading
the many millions of the poorest peasantry. This was the his-
torical significance of the October uprising.

Everything led the party to this path. Since the first days
of the Revolution, we had been preaching the necessity and in-
evitability of the power passing to the Soviets. After a great
internal struggle, the majority of the Soviets made this demand
their own, having accepted our point of view. We were pre-
paring the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets at which we
expected our party's complete victory. Under Dan's leadership
(the cautious Cheidze had departed for the Caucasus), the
Central Executive Committee attempted to block in every way
the calling of the Congress of the Soviets. After great exer-
tions, supported by the Soviet fraction of the Democratic Assem-

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bly, we finally secured the setting of the date of the Congress for
October 25th. This date was destined to become the greatest
day in the history of Russia. As a preliminary, we called in
Petrograd a Congress of Soviets of the Northern regions, in-
cluding the Baltic fleet and Moscow. At this Congress, we had
a solid majority, and obtained a certain support on the right in
the persons of the left S. R. faction, besides laying important
organizational premises for the October uprising.

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The Conflict Regarding the Petrograd Garrison

But even earlier, previous to the Congress of Northern So-
viets, there occurred an event which was destined to play a most
important role in the subsequent political struggle. Early in
October there came to a meeting of the Petrograd Executive
Committee, the Soviet's representative in the staff of the Petro-
grad Military District and announced that Headquarters de-
manded that two-thirds of the Petrograd garrison should be sent
to the front. For what purpose? To defend Petrograd. They
were not to be sent to the front at once, but still it was necessary
to make ready immediately. The Staff recommended that the
Petrograd Soviet approve this plan. We were on our guard.
At the end of August, also, five revolutionary regiments, com-
plete or in parts, had been taken out of Petrograd. This had
been done at the request of the then Supreme Commander
Korniloff, who at that very time was preparing to hurl a Cau-
casian division against Petrograd, with the intention of once for
all settling with the revolutionary capital. Thus we had already
the experience of purely political transfer of regiments under
the pretext of military operations. Anticipating events, I shall
say, that from documents brought to light after the October
Revolution it became clear beyond any doubt that the proposed
removal of the Petrograd garrison actually had nothing to do
with military purposes, but was forced upon Commander-in-
Chief Dukhonin, against his will, by none else but Kerensky, who
was striving to dear the capital of the most revolutionary
soldiers, i e., those most hostile to him. But at that time, early
in October, our suspicions evoked at first a storm of patriotic
indignation. The Staff people were pressing us, Kerensky was
impatient, for the ground under his feet had grown too hot. We,
on the other hand, delayed answering. Danger undoubtedly
threatened Petrograd and the question of defending the capital
loomed before us in all its terrible significance. But after the
Korniloff experience, after Rodzyanko's words concerning the
desirabilitv of the German occupation, whence should we take
the assurance that Petrograd would not be maliciously given up
to the Germans in unishment for its seditious spirit? The
Executive Committee refused to affix its seal blindly to the order

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to transfer two-thirds of the garrison. It was necessar}r to
verify, we said, whether there really were military considerations
back of this order, and therefore it was necessary to create an
organization for this verification. Thus was born the idea of
creating — ^by the side of the Soldiers' section of the Soviet, i. e.,
the garrison's political representation — a purely military organiza-
tion, in the form of a Military Revolutionary Committee, which
subsequently acquired enormous power and became the real tool
of the October Revolution. Undoubtedly, even in those hours,
when putting forth the idea of creating an organization in whose
hands would be concentrated the threads for guiding the Petro-
grad garrison on the purely military side, we clearly realized
that this very organization might become an irreplaceable revo-
lutionary tool. At that time we were already openly heading for
the uprising, and were preparing for it in an organized way.

As indicated above, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets was
set for October 25th. There could be no longer any doubt that
the Congress would declare itself in favor of power being handed
over to the Soviets. But such a resolution must forthwith be
put into actuality, else it would turn into a worthless, Platonic
demonstration. The logic of events, therefore, required us to set
the uprising for October 25th. Exactly so the entire bourgeois
press interpreted it. But in the first place, the fate of the Congress
depended upon the Petrograd garrison : would it allow Kerensky
to surround the Congress of Soviets and disperse it with the
assistance of several hundred or thousand military cadets, ensigns
and thugs? Did not the very attempt to remove the garrison
mean that the Government was preparing to disperse the Con-
gress of Soviets ? And strange it would be if it were not prepar-
ing, since we were, before the entire land, openly mobilizing the
Soviet forces in order to deal the coalition forces a death blow.

Thus the conflict at Petrograd was developing on the basis
of the question of the garrison's fate. First and foremost this
question touched all the soldiers to the quick. But the working-
men, too, felt the liveliest interest in the conflict, fearing as they
did that upon the garrison's removal they would be smothered by
the cadets and cossacks. Thus the conflict was assuming a char-
acter of the very keenest nature and developing on a soil ex-
tremely unfavorable for Kerensky's government.

Parallel with this was going on the above-described struggle

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for convoking the All-Russian Congress of Soviets — ^we, openly
declaring, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet and the Northern
Region Congress, that the Second Congress of Soviets must set
Kerensky's government aside and become the true master of the
Russian land. As a matter of fact the uprising was already on.
It was developing quite openly before the eyes of the whole
country.

During October the question of the uprising played an impor-
tant role in our party's inner life. Lenin, who was in hiding in
Finland, insisted, in numerous letters, upon more resolute tactics.
The lower strata were in ferment, and dissatisfaction was accumu-
lating because the Bolshevik party, which had proved to be in the
majority in the Petrograd Soviet, was drawing no practical con-
clusions from its own mottos. On October 10th a conspiratory
meeting of the Central Committee of our party took place, with
Lenin present. The question of the uprising was on the order of
the day. By a majority of all against two votes it was decided
that the only means of saving the Revolution and the country
from final dissolution lay in armed insurrection which must trans-
fer power into the hands of the Soviets.

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The Democratic Soviet and "Pre -Parliament"

The Democratic Soviet which had detached itself from the
Democratic Conference had absorbed all the helplessness of the
latter. The old Soviet parties, the Social-Revolutionists and the
Mensheviks, had created an artificial majority in it for them-
selves, only the more strikingly to reveal their political prostra-
tion. Behind the Soviet curtains, Tseretelli was carrying on in-
volved parleys with Kerensky and the representatives of the
"professional elements" as they began to say in the Soviet, — in
order to avoid the "insulting" term bourgeoisie.

Tseretelli's report on th^ourse and issue of the negotiations
was a sort of funeral oratira over a whole period of the Revolu-
tion. It turned out that neither Kerensky nor the professional
elements had consented to responsibility toward the new semi-
representative institution. On the other hand, outside the limits
of the Cadet Party, they had not succeeded in finding so-called
"efficient" social leaders. The organizers of the venture had to
capitulate on both points. The capitulation was all the more elo-
quent, because the Democratic Conference had been called exactly
for the purpose of doing away with the irresponsible rSgime,
while the Conference, by a formal vote, rejected a coalition with
the Cadets. At several meetings of the Democratic Soviet which
took place prior to the Revolution, there prevailed an atmosphere
of tenseness and utter incapacity for action. The Soviet did not
reflect the Revolution's march forward but the dissolution of the
parties that had lagged behind the Revolution.

Even previous to the Democratic Conference, in our party
faction, I had raised the question of demonstratively withdrawing
from the Conference and boycotting the Democratic Soviet. It
was necessary to show the masses by action that the fusionists
had led the Revolution into a blind alley. The fight for building
up the Soviet power could be carried on only in a revolutionary
way. The power must be snatched from the hands of those who
had proven incapable of doing any good and were furthermore
even losing their capacity for active evil. Their method of work-

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ing through an artificially picked Pre-Parliament and a con-
jectural Constituent Assembly, had to be opposed by our political
method of mobilizing the forces around the Soviets, through the
AU-Russian Congress of Soviets and through insurrection. This
could be done only by means of an open break, before the eyes of
the entire people, with the body created by Tseretelli and his
adherents, and by focusing on the Soviet institutions, the entire
attention and all the forces of the working class. This is why I
proposed the demonstrative withdrawal from the Conference and
a revolutionary agitation, in shops and regiments, against the
attempt to play false with the will of the Revolution and once
again turn its progress into the channel of cooperation with the
bourgeoisie. Lenin, whose letter we received a few days later,
expressed himself to the same effect. But in the party's upper
circles hesitation was still apparent on this question. The July
days had left a deep impression in the party's consciousness. The
mass of workingmen and soldiers hzH recovered from the July
debacle much more rapidly than had many of the leading com-
rades who feared the nipping of the Revolution in the bud by a
new premature onslaught of the masses. In our group of the
Democratic Conference, I mustered 50 votes in favor of my pro-
posal against 70 who declared for participating in the Democratic
Council. However, the experience of this participation soon
strengthened the party's left wing. It was growing too manifest
that combinations bordering on trickery, combinations that aimed
at securing further leadership in the Revolution for the profes-
sional elements, with the assistance of the fusionists, who had
lost ground among the lower levels of the people, offered no escape
from the impassi into which the laxness of bourgeois democracy
had driven the revolution. By the time the Democratic Soviet,
its ranks filled up with professional elements, became a Pre-Par-
liament, readiness to break with this institution had matured in
our party.

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The S. R/s and Mensheviks ^

We were confronted with the question whether the S. R.'s
would follow us in this path. This group was in the process of
formation, but this process, according to the standards of our
party, went on too slowly and irresolutely. At the outset of the
Revolution, the S. R.'s proved the predominating party in the
whole field of political life. Peasants, soldiers, even workingmen
voted en masse for the S. R.'s. The party itself had not expected
anything of the kind, and more than once it looked as if it were in
danger of being swamped in tlie waves of its own success. Ex-
cluding the purely capitalistic and landholder groups and the pro-
fessional elements among the intellectuals, one and all voted for
the revolutionary populists' party. This was natural in the initial
stage of the Revolution, when class lines had not had time to
reveal themselves, when the aspirations of the so-called united
revolutionary front found expression in the diffuse program of a
party that was ready to welcome equally the workingman who
feared to break away from the peasant; the peasant who was
seeking land and liberty ; the intellectual attempting to guide both
of them ; the chinovnik (officeholder) endeavoring to adjust him-
self to the new rigime.

When Kerensky, who had been counted a laborite in the
period of Czarism, joined the S. R.'s Party after the victory
of the Revolution, that party's popularity began to grow
in proportion as Kerensky mounted the rungs of power. Out
of respect, not always of a platonic nature, for the War Min-
ister, many colonels and generals hastened to enrol in the party of
the erstwhile terrorists. Old S. R.'s, with revolutionary tradi-
tions, regarded with some uneasiness the ever increasing number
of "March S. R.'s" that is, such party members as had discovered
within themselves a revolutionary populist soul only in March,
afer the Revolution had overthrown the old regime, and placed
the revolutionary populists in authority. Thus, within the limits
of its formlessness, this party contained not only the inner con-
tradictions of the developing Revolution, but also the prejudices
inherent in the backwardness of the peasant masses, and the

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sentimentalism, instability and career-chasing of the intellectual
strata. It was perfectly clear that'in that form the party could not
last long. With regard to ideas, it proved impotent from the very
start.

Politically, the guiding role belonged to the Mensheviks who
had gone through the school of Marxism and derived from it
certain procedures and habits, which aided them in finding their
bearings in the political situation to the extent of scientifically
falsifying the meaning of the current class struggle and securing
the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie in the highest degree
possible under the given circumstances. This is why the Men-
sheviks, direct pleaders for the bourgeoisie's right to power, ex-
hausted themselves so rapidly and, by the time of the October
Revolution, were almost completely played out.

The S. R.'s, too, were losing influence more and more — first
among the workingmen, then in the army, and finally in the vil-
lages. But toward the time of the October upheaval, they re-
mained still a very powerful party, numerically. * However, class
contradictions were undermining them from within. In opposi-
tion to the right wing which, in its most chauvinistic elements,
such as Avksentyef, Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Savinkoff, etc., had
finally gone over into the counter-revolutionary camp, a left wing
was forming, which strove to preserve its connection with the
toiling masses. If we merely recall the fact that the S.R., Avksen-
tyef, as Minister of the Interior, arrested the Peasant Land Com-
mittees, composed of S. R.'s, for their arbitrary solution of the
agrarian question, the amplitude of "differences" within this party
will become sufficiently clear to us.

In its center stood the party's traditional leader, Chernoff. A
writer of experienee, well-read in socialist literature, an ex-
perienced hand in factional strife, he had constantly remained at
the head of the party, when party life was being built up in emi-
grant circles abroad. The Revolution which had raised the S. R.
party to an enormous height with its first indiscriminating wave,
automatically raised Chernoff, too, only to reveal his complete
impotence even as compared with the other leading political lights
of the first period. The paltry resources which had secured to
Chernoff a preponderance in the populist circles abroad, proved
too light in the scales of the Revolution. He concentrated his

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efforts on not taking any responsible decisions, evading in all crit-
ical cases, waiting and abstaining. For some little time, tactics
of this kind secured for him the position as center between the
ever more diverging flanks. But there was no longer any possi-
bility of preserving party unity for long. The former terrorist,
Savinkof, took part in Korniloff's conspiracy, was in touching
unanimity with the counter-revolutionary circles of Cossack offi-
cers and was preparing an onslaught on Petrograd workingmen .
and soldiers, among whom there were quite a few left S. R/s.
As a sacrifice to the left wing, the Center expelled Savinkof from
the party, but hesitated to raise a hand against Kerensky. In the
Pre-Parliament, the' party showed signs of extreme disruption:
three groups existed indepenclently, though under the banner of
one and the samt party, but none of the groups knew exactly what
it wanted. The formal domination of this "party" in the Constit-
uent Assembly would have meant only a continuation of political
prostration.

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Withdrawing from the Pre -Parliament The Voice
of the Front

Before withdrawing from the membership in the Pre-Parlia-
ment where, according to Kerensky's and Tseretelli's political
statistics, we were entitled to some half a hundred seats, we
arranged a conference with the left S. R. group. They refused to
follow us, claiming that they still had to demonstrate practically
before the peasantry the insolvency of the Pre-Parliament. Said
one of the leaders of the left S. R/s :

"We deem it necessary to warn you that if you want to with-
draw from the Pre-Parliament in order forthwith to go into the
streets for an open fight, we shall not follow you."

The bourgeois-fusionist press accused ns of striving to kill
prematurely the Pre-Parliament, for the very purpose of creating
a revolutionary situation. At our faction meeting in the Pre-Par-
liament, it was decided to act independently and not wait for the
left S. R.'s. Our party's declaration, proclaimed from the Pre-
Parliament rostrum and explaining why we were breaking with
this institution, was greeted with a howl of hatred and impotence
on the part of the majority groups. In the Petrograd Soviet of
Deputies, where our withdrawal from the Pre-Parliament was
approved by an overwhelming majority, the leader of the tiny
"internationalist" Menshevik group, Martof, explained to us that
the withdrawal from the temporary Soviet of the Republic (such
was the official appellation of this little-respected institution)
would be sensible only in case we proposed immediately to assume
an open offensive. But the point is that this is just what we in-
tended. The prosecutors for the liberal bourgeoisie were right,
when accusing us of striving to create a revolutionary situation.
In open insurrection and direct seizure of power we beheld the
only way out of the situation.

Again, as in the July days, the press and all the other organs
of so-called public opinion were mobilized against us. From the
July arsenals were dragged forth the most envenomed weapons
which had been temporarily stored away there after the Komi-

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loff days. Vain efforts ! The mass was irresistibly moving toward
us, and its spirit was rising hour by hour. Frofti the trenches
delegates kept arriving. *'How long," said they, at the Petrograd
Soviet meetings, *'will this impossible situation last? The soldiers
hav€ told us to declare to you : if no decisive steps for peace are
made by November 1st, the trenches will be deserted, the entire
army will rush to the rear!" This determination was really
spreading at the front. There the soldiers were passing on, from
one unit to another, home-made proclamations, summoning them
not to remain in the trenches l^ter than the first snowfall. "You
have forgotten about us," the delegates on foot from the trenches
exclaimed at the Soviet meetings. "If you find no way out of the
situation, we shall come here ourselves, and with our bayonets
we shall disperse our enemies, including you." In the course of
a few weeks the Petrograd Council had become the center of
attraction for the whole army. After its leading tendency had
been changed and. new presiding officers elected, its resolutions
inspired the exhausted and despondent troops at the front with
the hope that the way out of the situation could be practically
found in the manner proposed by the Bolsheviks: by publishing
the secret treaties and proposing an immediate truce on all fronts.
"You say that power must pass into the hands of the Soviets,
grasp it then. You fear that the front will not support you. Cast
all misgivings aside, the soldier masses are with you in over-
whelming majority."

Meanwhile the conflict regarding the transfer of the garrison
kept on developing. Almost daily, a garrison conference met, con
^sisting of committees from the companies, regiments and com-
mands. The influence of our party in the garrison was established
definitely .and indestructibly. The Petrograd District Staff was
in a state of extreme perplexity. Now it would attempt to enter
into regular relations with us, then again, egged on by the leaders
of the Central Executive Committee, it would threaten us with
repressive measures.

Above, mention has already been made of organizing, at the
Petrograd Soviet, a Military Revolutionary Committee, which
was intended to be, in fact, the Soviet Staff of the Petrograd
garrison in opposition to Kerensky's Staff. "But the existence
of two staffs is inadmissible," the representatives of the fusionist
parties dogmatically admonished us. "But is a situation admissible,

4.S

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wherein the garrison mistrusts the official staff and fears that the
transfer of soldiers from Petrograd has been dictated by a new
counter-revolutionary machination?" we retorted. "The creation
of a second staff means insurrection," came the reply from the
Right. "Your Military Revolutionary Committee's task will not
be so much to verify the operative projects and orders of the mili-
tary authorities as the preparation and execution of an insurrec-
tion against the present government." This objection was just.
But for that very reason it did not frighten anybody. An over-
whelming majority of the Soviet was aware of the necessity of
overthrowing the coalition power. The more circumstantially
the Mensheviks and S. R.'s demonstrated that the Military Revo-
lutionary Committee would inevitably turn into an organ of insur-
rection, the greater the eagerness with which the Petrograd So-
viet supported the new fighting organization.

The Military Revolutionary Committee's first act was to ap-
point commissioners to all parts of the Petrograd garrison and all
the most important institutions of the capital and environs. From
various quarters we were receiving communications that the gov-
ernment, or more correctly, the government parties, were actively
organizing and arming their forces. From various arms-depots —
governmental and private — rifles, revolvers, machine g^ns and
cartridges were being brought forth for arming cadets, students
and bourgeois youths in general. It was necessary to take im-
mediate preventive measures. Commissioners were appointed to
all arms-depots and stores. Almost without opposition they be-
came masters of the situation. To be sure, the commandants and
proprietors of the depots tried not to recognize them, but a mere
application to the soldiers' committee or the employees of each
institution sufficed to cause the immediate breakdown of the
opposition. After that, arms were issued only on order of our
Commissioners.

Even prior to that, regiments of the Petrograd garrison had
their commissioners, but these had been appointed by the Central
Executive Committee. Above, we said that after tne June Con-
gress of Soviets, and particularly after the June 18th demonstra-
tion wTiich revealed the ever growing power of the Bolsheviks, the
fusionist parties had almost entirely deprived the Petro^ad So-
viet of any practical influence on the course of events in the revo-
lutionary capital. The leadership of the Petrograd garrison was
concentrated in the hands of the Central Executive Committee.

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Now the task everywhere was to put in the Petrograd Soviet's
Commissioners. This was adiieved with the most energetic co-
operation of the soldier masses. Meetings, addressed by speakers
of various parties, had the result, invariably, that regiment after
regiment declared it would recognize only the Petrograd Soviet's
Commissioners and would not budge a step without its decision.

An important role in appointing these Commissioners was
played by the Bolsheviks' military organization. Before the July
days it had developed a widespread agitational activity. On July
5th, a battalion of cyclists, brought by Kerensky to Petrograd,
battered down the isolated Kshessinsky mansion where our party's
military organization was quartered. The majority of leaders, and
many privates among the members were arrested, the publications
were stopped, the printing shop was wrecked. Only by degrees
did the organization begin to repair its machinery afresh, conspir-
atively this time. Numerically it comprised in its ranks but a very
insignificant part of the Petrograd garrison, a few hundred men
all told. But there were .among them many soldiers and young
officers, chiefly^ ensigns, resolute, and with heart and soul devoted
to the Revolution, who had passed through Kerensky's prisons in
July and Augfust. All of them had placed themselves at the Mil-
itary Revolutionary Committee's disposal and were being assigned
to the most responsible fighting posts.

However, it would not be superfluous to remark that precisely
the members of our party's military organization assumed, in
October an attitude of extraordinary caution and even some
skepticism toward the idea of an immediate insurrection. The
closed character of the organization and its officially military
character involuntarily inclined its leaders to underestimate the
purely technical and organizational resources of the uprising, and
irotti this point of view we were undoubtedly weak. Our strength
lay in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and their readi-
ness to fight under our banner.

Parallel with the organizing activity a stormy agitation was
being carried on. This was the period of incessant meetings at
works, in the "Modern" and "Chinizelli" circuses, at clubs, in
barracks. The atmosphere at all the meetings was charged with
electricity. Each mention of the insurrection was greeted with a
storm of plaudits and shouts of delight. The bourgeois press
merely increased the state of universal panic. An order issued
over my signature to the Syestroyetsk munitions factory to issue

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five thousand rifles to the Red Guard evoked an indescribable
panic in bourgeois circles. "The general massacre" in course of
preparation was talked and written about everywhere. Of course,
this did not in the least prevent the workingmen of the Syes-
troyetsk munitions factory from handing the arms over to the
Red Guards. The more frantically the bourgeois press slandered
and baited us, the more ardently the masses responded to our call.
It was growing clearer and clearer for both sides that the crisis
must break within the next few days. The press of the S. R.'s
and Mensheviks was sounding an alarm. "The Revolution is in
the greatest danger. A repetition of the July days is being pre-
pared — ^but on a much wider basis and therefore still more de-
structive in its consequences. In his Novaya Zhizn, Gorki daily
prophesied the approaching wreck of all civilization. In general,
the Socialistic veneer of the bourgeois intellectuals was wearing
off at the approach of the stem domination of the workers' dic-
tatorship. But, on the other hand, the soldiers of even the most
backward regiments hailed with delight the Military Revolution-
ary Committee's commissioners. Delegates came to us from Cos-
sack units and from the Socialist minority of military cadets.
They promised at least to assure the neutrality of their units in
case of open conflict. Manifestly Kerensky's government was
losing its foundations.

The District Staff began negotiations with us and proposed
a x:ompromise. In order to size up the enemy's full resistance,
we entered into pourparlers. But the Staff was nervous; now
they exhorted, then threatened us, they even declared our com-
missioners to be without power, which, however, did not in the
least affect their work. In accord with the Staff, the Central
Executive Committee appointed Captain of Staff Malefski to be
Chief Commissioner for the Petrograd Military District and
magnanimously consented to recognize our commissioners, on
condition of their being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner.
The proposal was rejected and the negotiations broken off.
Prominent Mensheviks and S. R.'s came to us as intermediaries,
exhorted, threatened and foretold our doom and the doom of the
Rfevolutiop.

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The "Petrograd Soviet Day''

At this period the Smolny building was already completely
in the hands of the Petrograd Soviet and of our party. The
Mensheviks and the S. R/s transferred their political activity
to the Maryiinsky Palace, where the infant Pre-Parliament was
already expiring. In the Pre-Parliament Kerensky delivered a
great speech, in which, stormily applauded by the bourgeois
wing, he endeavored to conceal his impotence behind clamorous
threats. The Staff made its last attempt at opposition. To all
units of the garrison it sent out invitations to appoint two dele-
gates to conferences concerning the removal of troops from the
capital. The first conference was called for October 22nd, at
11 P. M. From the regiments we immediately received informa-
tion about it. By telephone we issued a call for a garrison con-
ference at 11 A. M. Withal, a part of the delegates did get to
the Staff quarters, only to declare that without the Petrograd
Soviet's decision they would not move anywhere. Almost unani-
mously the Garrison Conference confirmed its allegiance to the
Military Revolutionary Committee. Objections came only from
official representatives of the former Soviet parties, but they
found no response whatever among the regimental delegates.
The Staff's attempt brought out only more strikingly that we
v/ere standing on firm ground. In the front rank there was the
Volhynian Regiment, the very one which on July 4th, with its
band playing, had invaded the Taurida Palace, in order to put
down the Bolsheviks.

As already mentioned earlier, the Central Executive Com-
mittee had charge of the Petrograd Soviet's treasjiry and its
publications. An attempt to obtain even a single one of these
publications brought no results. Beginning with the end of Sep-
tember, we initiated a series of measures toward, creating an in-
dependent newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet. But all printing
establishments were occupied and their owners boycotted us with
the assistance of the Central Executive Committee. It was de-
cided to arrange for a "Petrograd Soviet Day," for the purpose
of developing a widespread agitation and collecting pecuniary
resources for establishing a newspaper. About a fortnight be-
fore, this day was set for October 22nd, and consequently it

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coincided with the moment of the open outburst of the insur-
rection.

With complete assurance, the hostile press announced Siat
on October 22nd an armed insurrection of the Bolsheviks would
occur in the streets of Petrograd. That the insurrection would
occur, nobody had any doubt. They only tried to determine
exactly when; they guessed, they prophesied, striving in this
way to force a denial or confession on our part. But the Soviet
calmly and confidently marched forward, making no answer to
the howl of bourgeois public opinion. October 22nd became the
reviewing day for the forces of the proletarian army. It went
off magnificently in every respect. In spite of the warnings com-
ing from the Right that blood would flow in torrents in the streets
of Petrograd, the masses of the populace were pouring in floods
to the Petrograd Soviet meetings. AH our oratorical forces were
mobilized. All public places were filled. Meetings were held
unceasingly for hours at a stretch. They were addressed by
speakers of our party, by delegates arriving for the Soviet Con-
gress, by representatives from the front, by left S. R.'s and by
Anarchists. Public buildings were flooded by waves of working-
men, soldiers and sailors. There had not been many gatherings
like that even in the time of the Revolution. Up rose a consider-
able mass of the petty townfolk, less frightened than aroused by
the shouts, warnings and baiting of the bourgeois press. Waves
of people by tens of thousands dashed agaipst the People's
House building, rolled through the corridors, filled the halls.
On the iron columns^ huge garlands of human heads, feet and
hands were hanging like bunches of grapes. The air was sur-
charged with< the electric tension that heralds the most critical
moments of revolution. "Down with Kerensky's government!
Down with the war ! All power to the Soviets !" Not one from
the ranks (tf the previous Soviet parties ventured to appear be-
fore those colossal throngs with a word of reply. The Petrograd
Soviet held undivided sway. In reality the campaign had already
been won. It dnly remained to deal the last military blow to this
spectral authority.

The most cautious in our midst were reporting that there
still remained units that were not with us: the cossacks, the
cavalry regiment, the Semyonofski regiment, the cyclists. Com-
missioners and agitators were assigned to these units. Their
reports sounded perfectly satisfactory: the red-hot atmosphere

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was infecting one and all, and the most conservative elements
cf the army were losing the strength to withstand the general
tendency of the Petrograd garrison. In the Semyonofski regi-
ment, which was considered the bulwark of Kerensky's govern-
ment, I was present at a meeting which took place in the open
air. The most prominent speakers of the right wing addressed
it. They clung to the conservative guard regiments as to the
last support of the coalition power. Nothing would avail. By
an overwhelming majority of votes, the regiment expressed it-
self for us and did not even give the ex-ministers a chance to
finish their speeches. The groups which still opposed the Soviet
watch-words were made up mainly of officers, volunteers and
generally of bourgeois intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. The
masses of peasants and workmen were with us one and all.
The demarcation ran as a distinct social line.

The Fortress of Peter and Paul is the central military base
of Petrograd. As commandant thereof we appointed a
young ensign. He proved the best man for the post and
within a few hours he became master of the situation. The
lawful authorities withdrew, biding their time. The element
regarded as unreliable for us were the cyclists, who in July
had smashed our party's military organization in the Kshes-
sinsky mansion and taken possesion of the mansion itself.
On the 23rd, I went to the Fortress about 2 P. M. Within
the courtyard a meeting was being held. The speakers of
the right wing were cautious and evasive in the extreme,
painstakingly avoiding the question of Kerensky, whose
name inevitably aroused shouts of protest and indignation
even among the soldiers. We were listened to, and our advice
v/as followed. About four o'clock, the cyclists assembled near-
by, in the ''Modern'' Circus, for a battalion meeting. Among
the speakers appearing there was Quartermaster-General
Paradyelof. He spoke with extreme caution. The days had
been left far behind, when official and semi-official speakers
referred to the party of the workers merely as to a gang of trait-
ors and hired agents of the German Kaiser.

The Lieutenant-Commander of the Staff accosted me with :
''We really ought to be able to come to some agreement."
But it was already too late. The whole battalion, with only thirty
dissenting votes, had voted for handing over all power to the
Soviets.

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The Beginning of the Revolution

The government of Kerensky was restlessly looking for
refuge, now one way, now another. Two new cyclist bat-
talions, and the Zenith Battery were called back from the front,
and an attempt was made to call back some companies of

cavalry The cyclists telegraphed while on the road

to the Petrograd Soviet: "We are led to Petrograd without
knowing the reasons. Request explanations." We ordered
them to stop and send a delegation to Petrograd. Their rep-
resentatives arrived and declared at a meeting of the Soviet
that the battalion was entirely with us. This was greeted by
enthusiastic cheers. The battalion received orders to enter
the city immediately.

The number of delegates from the front was increasing
every day. They came to get information about the situation.
They gathered our literature and went to bring the message
to the front that the Petrograd Soviet was conducting a strug-
gle for the power of the workers, soldiers and peasants. "The
men in the trenches will support you," they told us. All the
old army committees which had not been reelected for the
last four or five months, sent threatening telegrams to us,
which, however, made no impression. We knew that these
committees were no less out of touch with the rank and file
of the soldiers than the Central Executive Committee with
the local Soviets.

The Military Revolutionary Committee appointed com-
missaries to all railroad depots. These commissaries kept a
watchful eye upon all the arriving and departing trains and
especially upon the movements of troops. Continuous tele-
phone and motor car communication was established with
the neighboring cities and their garrisons. The Soviets of all
the communities near Petrograd were charged with the. duty
of vigilantly preventing any counter-revolutionary troops, or,
rather, troops misled by the government, from entering the
capital. The railroad officials of lower rank and the workmen
recognized our commissaries immediately. Difficulties arose

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on the 24th at the telephone station. They stopped connect-
ing us. The cadets took possession of the station and under
their protection the telephone operators began to oppose the
Soviet. This was the first appearance of the future sabotage.
The Military Revolutionary Committee sent a detachment to
the telephone station and placed two small cannons, there. In
this way the seizing of all departments of the government and
instruments of administration was started. The sailors and
Red Guards occupied the telegraph station, the post office and
other institutions. Measures were taken to take possession of
the state bank. The center of the government, the Institute
of Smolny, was turned into a fortress. There were in the
garret, as a heritage of the old Central Executive Committee,
a score of machine guns, but they were in poor condition and
had been entirely neglected by the cartakers. We ordered
an additional machine gun company to the Smolny Institute.
Early in the morning the sailors rolled the machine gun with
a deafening rumble over the cement floors of the long and
half-dark corridors of the building. Out of the doors the
frightened faces of the few S. R.'s and Mensheviks were look-
ing and wondering. •

The Soviet held daily meetings in the Smolny and so did
the Garrison Council.

On the third floor of the Smolny, in a small corner room,
the Military Revolutionary Committee was in continuous ses-
sion. There was centered all the information about the move-
ments of the troops, the spirit of the soldiers and workers, the
agitation in the barracks, the undertakings of the pogrom in-
stigators, the councils of the bourgeois politicians, the life at
the Winter Palace, the plans of the former Soviet parties.
Informers came from all sides. There came workers, officers,
porters. Socialist cadets, servants, ladies. Many brought pure
nonsense. Others gave serious and valuable information.
The decisive moment drew near. It was apparent that there
was no going back.

On the evening of the 24th of October, Kerensky appeared
in the Preliminary Parliament and demanded approval of re-
pressive measures against the Bolsheviki. The Preliminary
Parliament, however, was in a sad state of indetermination
and complete disintegration. The Constitutional Democrats

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tried to persuade the right S. R/s to adopt a vote of confidence.
The right S. R/s exercised pressure upon the center.
The center hesitated. The "leff wing conducted a policy of
parliamentary opposition. After many conferences, debates,
hesitations, the resolution of the "left" wing was adopted.
This resolution condemned the rebellious movement of the
Soviet, but the responsibilities for the movement were laid at
the door of the anti-democratic policy of the government.
The mail brought scores of letters daily informing us of death
sentences pronounced against us, of infernal machines, of the
expected blowing up of the Smolny, etc. The bourgeois press
howled wildly, moved by hatred and terror. Gorki, who had
forgotten all about "The Song of the Falcon," continued to
prophesy in his Novaya Zhizn the approach of the end of the
world.

The members of the Military Revolutionary Committee did
not leave the Smolny during the entire week. They slept on
sofas and only at odd intervals, wakened by couriers, scouts,
cyclists, telegraph messengers and telephone calls. The night
of the 24th-25th was the most restless. We received a
telephone communication from Pavlovsky that the govern-
ment had called artillery from the Peterhof School of Ensigns.
At the Winter Palace, Kerensky gathered the cadets and offi-
cers. We gave out orders over the telephone to place on all
the roads leading to Petrograd reliable military defence and
to send agitators to meet the military detachment called by
the government. In case persuasion would not help they were
instructed to use armed force. All the negotiations were held
over the telephone in the open, and therefore were accessible
to the agents of the government.

The commissaries informed us over the telephone that on
all the roads leading to Petrograd our friends were on the
alert. A cadet detachment from Oranienbaum nevertheless
succeeded in getting by our military defence during the night
and over the telephone we followed their further movements.
The outer guard of the Smolny was strengthened by another
company. Communications with all the detachments of the
garrison went on continuously.

The companies on guard in all the regiments were awaken.
The delegates of every detachment were day and night at ,

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the disposal of the Military Revolutionary Committee. Art
order was given to suppress the agitation of the Black
Hundred without reserve, and at the first attempts at pogroms
on the streets, arms should be used without mercy.

During this decisive night all the most important points
of the city passed into our hands — almost without any op-
position, without struggle and without bloodshed. The State
Bank was guarded by a government detachment and an
armored car. The building was surrounded on all sides by
our troops. The armored car was taken by an unexpected
attack and the bank went over into the hands of the Military
Revolutionary Committee without a single shot being fired.
There was on the river Neva, behind the Franco-Russian
plant, the cruiser Aurora, which was under repair. Its crew
consisted entirely of sailors devotedly loyal to the revolution.
When Korniloff, at the end of August, threatened Petrogprad
the sailors of the Aurora were called by the government to
guard the Winter Palace, and though even then they already
hated the government of Kerensky, they realized that it was
their duty to dam the wave of the counter-revolution, and they
took their post without objection. When the danger passed
they were sent back. Now, in the days of the October up-
rising, they were too dangerous. The Aurora was ordered
by the Minister of the Navy to weigh anchor and to get out
of Petrograd. The crew informed us immediately of this
order. We annulled it and the cruiser remained where it was,
ready at any moment to put all its military forces and means
at the disposal of the Soviets.

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The Decisive Day

At the dawn of the 25th, a man and woman, employed in
the party's printing office, came to Smolny and informed us
that the government had closed the official journal of our
body and the "New Gazette" of the Petrograd Soviet. The
printing office was sealed by some agent of the government.
The Military Revolutionary Committee immediately recalled
the orders and took both publications under its protection,
enjoining upon the "gallant Wolinsky Regiment the great
honor of securing the free Socialist press against counter-
revolutionary attempts." The printing, after that, went on
without interruption and both publications appeared on time.

The government was still in session at the Winter Palace,
but it was no more than its own shadow. As a political power
it no longer existed. On the 25th of October the Winter
Palace was gradually surrounded by our troops from all sides.
At one O'clock in the afternoon I declared at the session of
the Petrograd Soviet, in the name of the Military Revolution-
ary Committee, that the government of Kerensky had ceased
to exist and that forthwith, and until the All-Russian Con-
vention of the Soviets might decide otherwise, the power was
to pass into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee.

A few days earlier Lenin left Finland and was hiding in
the outskirts of the city, in the workingmen's quarters. Oil
the evening of the 25th, he came secretly to the Smolny. Ac-
cording to newspaper information, it seemed to him that the
issue would be a temporary compromise between ourselves
and the Kerensky Government. The bourgeois press had so
often clamored about the approach of the revolution, about
the demonstration of armed soldiers on the streets, about
pillaging and unavoidable streams of blood, that now this
press failed to notice the revolution which was really taking
place, and accepted the negotiations of the general staff with
us at their face value. Meanwhile, without any chaos, with-
out street fights, without firing or bloodshed, the government

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institutions were occupied one after another by severe and
disciplined detachments of soldiers, sailors and Red Guards,
in accordance with the exact telephone orders given from the
small room on the third floor of the Smolny Institute. In the
evening a preliminary session of the Second All-Russian Con-
vention of Soviets was held. In the name of the Central
Kxecutive Committee, Dan presented a report. He presented
an indictment of the rebellious usurpers and insurgents and
attempted to frighten the Convention with a vision of the
inevitable failure of the insurrection, which, he claimed, would
be suppressed by the forces from the front. His address
sounded unconvincing and out of place within the walls of a
hall where the overwhelming majority of the delegates were
enthusiastically observing the victorious advance of the Petro-
grad revolution.

By this time the Winter Palace was surrounded, but it
was not yet taken. From time to time there were shots from
the windows upon the besiegers, who were closing in slowly
and cautiously. From the- Petropavlovsk Fortress, two or
three shells from cannons were directed at the Palace. Their
thunder was heard at the Smolny. Martof spoke with help-
less indignation from the platform of the convention, about
civil war and especially about the siege of the Winter Palace,
where among the ministers there were — oh, horror 1 — mem-
bers of the Mensheviki party. The sailors who came to bring
information from the battle-place around the Palace took the
floor against him. They reminded the accusers of the offen-
sive of the 18th of June, of the treacherous policy of the old
government, of the re-establishment of the death penalty for
soldiers, of the annihilation of the revolutionary organization,
and wound up by vowing to win or die. They also brought
word of the first victims from our ranks in the battle before
the Palace.

All arose as if at an unseen signal and, with a unanimity
which could be created only by a high moral inspiration, sang
the Funeral March. He who lived through that moment will
never forget it.

The session was interrupted. It was impossible to delib-
erate theoretically the question of the means of reconstruct-
ing the government among the echoes of the fighting and

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shooting under the walls of the Winter Palace, where the
fate of that very government was being decided in a practical
way. The taking of the Palace, however, was rather slow,
and this caused hesitation among the less determined elements
of the convention. The orators of the right wing prophesied
our near destruction. All anxiously awaited news from the
arena of the Palace. Presently Antonoff appeared, who di-
rected the operations against the Palace. A death-like silence
fell upon the hall. The Winter Palace was taken ; Kerensky
had fled; other ministers had been arrested and consigned to
the fortress of Petropavlovsk. The first chapter of the Octo-
ber revolution was over.

The Right Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, alto-
gether sixty men, that is, about one-tenth of the convention,
left the session in protest. As there was nothing else left to
them, they "placed the entire responsibility" for the coming
events upon the Bolsheviki and Left S. R/s. The latter were
passing through moments of indecision. The past tied them
strongly to the party of Chernoff. The right wing of this
party swerved to the middle and petty bourgeois elements, to
the intellectuals of the middle classes, to the well-to-do ele-
ments of the villages ; and on all decisive questions went hand
in hand with the liberal bourgeoisie against us. The more
revolutionary elements of the party, reflecting the radicalism
of the social demands of the poorest masses of the peasantry,
gravitated to the proletariat and their party. They feared,
however, to sever the umbilical cord which linked them to
their old party. When we left the Preliminary Parliament,
they refused to follow us and warned us against "adventur-
ers," but the insurrection put before them the dilemma of
taking sides for or against the Soviets. Not without hesita-
tion, they assembled on our side of the barricades.

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The Fonpation of the Soviet of the People's
Comiinissaries

The victory in Petrograd was complete. The power went
over entirely to the Military Revolutionary Gommittee. We
issued our first decree, abolishing the death penalty and order-
ing reelections in the army committees, etc. But here we
discovered that we were cut off from the provinces. The
higher authorities of the railroads, post office and telegraph
were against us. The army committees, the municipalities,
the zemstvos continued to bombard the Smolny with threat-
ening telegrams in which they declared outright war upon
us and promised to sweep the insurgents out within a short
time. Our telegrams, decrees and explanations did not reach
the provinces, for the Petrograd Telegraph Agency refused
to serve us. In this atmosphere, created by the isolation of
the capital from the rest of the country, alarming and mon-
strous rumors easily sprang up and gained popularity.

When finally convinced that the Soviet had really taken
over the powers of the government, that the old government
was arrested, that the streets of Petrograd were dominated
by armed workers, the bourgeois press, as well as the press
which was for eflfecting a compromise, started a campaigpi of
incomparable madness indeed; there was not a lie or libel
which was not mobilized against the Military Revolutionary
Committee, its leaders or its commissaries.

On the 26th there was a session of the Petrograd Soviet,
which was attended by delegates from the AU-Russian Coun-
cil, members of the Garrison Conference, and numerous mem-
bers of various parties. Here, for the first time in nearly six
months, spoke Lenin and Zinoviev, who were given a stormy
ovation. The jubilation over the recent victory was marred
somewhat by apprehensions as to how the country would
take to the new revolt and as to the Soviets' ability to retain
control.

In the evening an executive session of the Council of So-

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viets was held. Lenin introduced two decrees: on peace and
on the land question. After brief discussion, both decrees
were adopted unanimously. It was at this session, too, that
a new central authority was created, to be known as the
Council of People's Commissaries.

The Central Committee of our party tried to win the ap-
proval of the Left S. R.'s, who were invited to participate in
establishing the Soviet government. They hesitated, on the
ground that, in their view, this government should bear a
coalition character within the Soviet parties. But the Men-
sheviki and the Right S. R.'s broke entirely with the Council
of Soviets, deeming a coalition with anti-Soviet parties neces-
sary. There was nothing left for us to do but to let the party
of Left S. R.'s persuade their neighbors to the right to return
to the revolutionary camp; and while they were engaged in
this hopeless task, we thought it our duty to take the re-
sponsibility for the government entirely upon our party. The
list of Peoples' Commissaries was composed exclusively of
Bolsheviki.

There was undoubtedly some political danger in such a
course. The change proved too precipitate. (One need but
remember that the leaders of this party were only yesterday
still under indictment under Statute Law No. 108— that is,
accused of high treason). But there was no other alternative.
The other Soviet groups hesitated and evaded the issue, pre-
ferring to adopt a waiting policy. Finally we became con-
vinced that only our party could set up a revolutionary gov-
ernment.

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The First Days of the New Regime

The decrees on land and peace, approved by the Council,
were printed in huge quantities and — ^through delegates from
the front, peasant pedestrians arriving from the villages, and agi-
tators sent by us to the trenches in the provinces — were strewn
broadcast all over the country. Simultaneously the work of
organizing and arming the Red Guards was carried on. To-
getfier with the old garrison and the sailors, the Red Guard was
doing hard patrol duty. The Council of People's Commissaries
got control of one government department after another, though
everywhere encountering the passive resistance of the higher and
middle grade officials. The former Soviet parties tried their
utmost to find support in this class and organize a sabotage of
the new government. Our enemies felt certain that the whole
affair was a mere episode, that in a day or two — at most a week —
the Soviet Government would be overthrown. The first foreign
ounciUors and members of the embassies, impelled quite as
much by curiosity as by necessary business on hand, appeared at
the Smolny Institute. Newspaper correspondents hurried thither
with their notebooks and cameras. Everyone hastened to catch
a glimpse of the new government, being sure that in a day or two
it would be too late.

Perfect' order reigned in the city. The sailors, soldiers and
the Red Guards bore themselves in these first days with excellent
discipline and nobly supported the regime of stern revolutionary
order.

In the enemy's camp fear arose lest the "episode" should be-
come too protracted, and so the first force for attacking the new
government was being hastily organized. In this, the initiative
was taken by the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. In
the preceding period they would not, and dared not, take all the
power into their own hands. In keeping with their provisional
political position, they contented themselves with serving in the
coalition government in the capacity of assistants, critics, and
benevolent accusers and defenders of the bourgeoisie. During all
elections they conscientiously anathematized the liberal bour-

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geoisie, while in the government they just as regularly combined
with it. In the first six months of me revolution they managed,
as a result of this policy, to lose absolutely all, the confidence
of the populace and army; and now, the October revolt was
dashing them from the helm of the state. And yet, only yester-
day they considered themselves the masters of the situation. The
Bolshevik leaders whom they persecuted were in hiding, as un-
der Czarism. To-day the Bolsheviki were in power, while yester-
day's coalitionist ministers and their co-workers found them-
selves cast aside and suddenly deprived of every bit of influence
upon the further course of events. They would not and could
not believe that this sudden revolt marked the beginning of a
new era. They preferred to consider it as merely accidental, the
result of some misunderstanding, which could be removed by a
few energetic speeches and accusational newspaper articles. But
every hour they encountered more and more insurmountable ob-
stacles. This is what caused their blind, truly furious hatred.

The bourgeois politicians did not venture, to be sure, to get
too close to danger. They pushed to the front the Social-Revo-
lutionists and Mensheviki, who, in the attack upon us acquired
all that energy which they had lacked during the period when they
were a semi-governing power. Their organs circulated the most
amazing rumors and Ties. In their name it was that the procla-
mations containing open appeals to crush the new government
were issued. It was they, too, who organized the government
officials for sabotage and the cadets for military resistance.

On the 27th and 28th we continued to receive persistent
threats by telegraph from army committees, town dumas,
vikzhel zemstvos, and organizations (which had charge of the
management of the Railroad Union). On the Nevsky Prospect,
the principal thoroughfare of the capital's bourgeoisie, things
were becoming more and more lively. The bourgeois youth was
emerging from its stupor and, urged on by the press, was devel-
oping a wider and wider .agitation against the Soviet government.
With the help of the bourgeois crowd, the cadets were disarming
individual Red Guardsmen. On the side-streets Red Guardsmen
and sailors were being shot down. A group of cadets seized the
telephone station. Attempts were made by the same side to seize
the telegraph office. Finally, we learned that three armored cars
had fallen into the hands of some inimical military organization.
The bourgeois elements were clearly raising their heads. The

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newspapers heralded the fact that we had but a few hours more
I to live. Our friends intercepted a few secret orders which made

it clear, however, that a militant organization had been formed
j to fight the Petrograd Soviet. The leading place in this organiza-

I tion was taken by the so-called Committee for the Defence of the

Revolution, organized by the local Duma and the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the former rigime. Here and there Right
Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki held sway. At the disposal
■ of this committee were the cadets, students, and many counter-

revolutionary army officers, who sought, from under cover of the
I coalitions, to deal the Soviets a mortal blow.

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The Cadet Uprising of October 29th

The stronghold of the counter-revolutionary organization was
the cadet schools and the Engineering Castle, where considerable
arms and ammunition were stored, and from where attacks were
made upon the revolutionary government's headquarters. De-
tachments of Red Guards and sailors had surrounded the cadet
schools and were sending in messengers demanding the surrender
of all arms. Some scattering shots came in reply. The besiegers
were trampled upon. Crowds of people gathered around them,
and not infrequently stray shots fired from the windows would
wound passers-by.

The skirmishes were assuming an indefinitely prolonged char-
acter, and this threatened the revolutionary detachments with
demoraliation. It was necessary, therefore, to adopt the most
determined measures. The task of disarming the cadets was
assigned to the commandant of Petropavlovsk fortress. En-
sign B. He closely surrounded the cadet schools, brought up some
armored cars and artillery, and gave the cadets ten minutes' time
to surrender. Renewed firing from the windows was the answer
at first. At the expiration of the ten minutes, B. ordered an
artillery charge. The very first shots made yawning breaches
in the walls of the schoolhouse. The cadets surrendered, though
many of them tried to save themselves by flight, firing as they
fled.

Considerable rancor was created, such as always accompanies
civil war. The sailors undoubtedly committed many outrages
upon individual cadets. The bourgeois press later accused the
sailors and the Soviet government of inhumanity and brutality.
It never mentioned, however, the fact that the revolt of October
25th-26th had been brought about with hardly any firing or sacri-
fice, and that only the counter-revolutionary conspiracy which
was organized by the bourgeoisie and which threw the young
generation into the flame of civil war against the workers, sol-
diers and sailors, led to unavoidable severities and sacrifices.

The 29th of October marked a decided change in the mood of
the inhabitants of Petrograd. Events took on a more tra^^c

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character. At the same time, our enemies realized that the situa-
tion was far more serious than they thought at first and that the
Soviet had not the slightest intention of relinquishing the power
it had won just to oblige the junkers and the capitaJistic news-
papers.

The work of clearing Petrograd of counter-revolutionary
centers was carried on intensively. The cadets were almost all
disarmed, the participators in the insurrection were arrested and
either imprisoned in the Petropavlovsk fortress or deported to
Kronstadt. All publications which openly preached revolt against
Soviet authority were promptly suppressed. Orders were issued
for the arrest of such of the leaders of the former Soviet parties
whose names figured on the intercepted counter-revolutionary
edicts. All military resistance in the capital was crushed abso-
lutely.

Next came a long and exhausting struggle against the sabo-
tage of the bureaucrats, technical workers, clerks, etc. These
elements, which by their earning capacity belong largely to the
downtrodden class of society, align themselves with the bour-
geois class by the conditions of &eir life and by their general
psychology. They had sincerely and faithfully served the gov-
ernment and its institutions when it was headed by Czarism.
They continued to serve the government when the authority
passed over into the hands of tiie bourgeois imperialists. They
were inherited with all their knowledge and technical skill, by
the coalition government in the next period of the revolution. But
when the revolting workingmen, soldiers and peasants flung the
parties of the exploiting classes away from the rudder of State
and tried to take the management of affairs into their own
hands, then the bureaucrats and clerks flew into a passion and
absolutely refused to support the new government in any way.
More and more extensive became this sabotage, which was or-
ganized mostly by Social-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, and
which was supported by funds furnished by the banks and the
Allied Embassies.

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Kerensky's Advance on Petrograd

The stronger the Soviet government became in Petrograd,
the more the bourgeois groups placed their hopes on military aid
from without. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency, the railroad
telegraph, and the ladio-telegraph station of Tsarskoye-Selo
brought from every side news of huge forces marching on
Petrograd with the object of crushing the rebels there and estab-
lishing order. Kerensky was making flying trips to the front, and
the bourgeois papers reported that he was leading innumerable
forces against the Bolsheviki. We found ourselves cut oflE from
the rest of the country, as the telegraphers refused to serve us.
But the soldiers, who arrived by tens and hundreds on commis-
sions from their respective regiments, invariably said to us:
"Have no fears of the front; it is entirely on your side. You
need but give the word, and we will send to your aid — even this
very day — a division or a corps." It was the same in the army
as ever3rwhere else; the masses were for us, and the upper
classes against us. In the hands of the latter was the military-
technical machinery. Various parts of the vast army proved to
be isolated one from another. We were isolated from both the
army and the people. Nevertheless, the news of the Soviet gov-
ernment at Petrograd and its decrees spread throughout the coun-
try and roused the local Soviets to rebel against the old govern-
ment.

The reports of Kerensky's advance on Petrograd, at the head
of some forces or other, soon became more persistent and as-
sumed more definite outlines. We were informed from Tsars-
koye-Selo that Cossack echelons were not far from there, while an
appeal, signed by Kerensky and General Krassnov, was being
circulated in Petrograd calling upon the whole garrison to join
the government's forces, which were expected any hour to enter
the capital. The cadet insurrection of October 29th was un-
doubtedly connected with Kerensky's undertaking, only that it
broke out too soon, owing to determined action on our part. The
Tsarskoye-Selo garrison was ordered to demand of the approadi-
ing Cossack regiments recognition of the Soviet government. In
case of refusal, the Cossacks were to be disarmed. But that

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garrison proved to be ill-fitted for military operations. It had no
artillery and no leaders, its officers being unfriendly toward the
Soviet government. The Cossacks took possession of the radio-
telegraph station at Tsarskoye-Selo, the most powerful one in
the country, and marched on. The garrisons of Peterhof, Kras-
noye-Selo and Gatchina displayed neither initiative nor reso-
lution.

After the almost bloodless victory at Petrograd, the soldiers
confidently assumed that matters would take a similar course in
the future. All that was necessary, they thought, was to send an
agitator to the Cossacks, who would lay down their arms the
moment the object of the proletarian revolution was explained
to them. KornilofFs counter-revolutionary uprising was put
down by means of speeches and fraternization. By agitation and
well-planned seizure of certain institutions — without a fight —
the Kerensky government was overthrown. The same methods
were now being employed by the leaders of the Tsarskoye-Selo,
Krasnoye-Selo and the Gatchina Soviets with General Krass-
nov's Cossacks. But this time they did not work. Though with-
out determination or enthusiasm, the Cossacks did advance. In-
dividual detachments approached Gatchina and Krasnoye-Selo,
engaged the scanty forces of the local garrisons, and sometimes
disarmed them. About the numerical strength of Kerensky's
forces we at first had no idea whatever. Some said that General
Krassnov headed ten thousand men ; others affirmed that he had
no more than a thousand; while the unfriendly newspapers and
circulars announced, in letters an inch big, that two corps were
lined up beyond Tsarskoye-Selo.

There was a general want of confidence in the Petrograd
garrison. No sooner had it won a bloodless victory, than it was
called upon to march out against an enemy of unknown num-
bers and engage in battles of uncertain outcome. In the Garrison
Conference, the discussion centered about the necessity of send-
ing out more and more agitators and of issuing appeals to the
Cossacks; for to the soldiers it seemed impossible that the Cos-
sacks would refuse to rise to the point of view which the Petro-
grad garrison was defending in its struggle. Nev^ftheless, ad-
vanced groups of Cossacks approached quite close to Petrograd,
and we anticipated that the principal battle would take place in
the streets of the city.

The greatest resolution was shown by the Red Guards. They

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demanded arras, ammunition, and leadership. But everything in
the military machine was disorganized and out of gear, owing
partly to disuse and partly to evil intent. The officers had re-
signed. Many had fled. The rifles were in one place and the
cartridges in another. Matters were still worse with artillery.
The cannons, gun carriages and the military stores were all in
different places ; and all these had to be groped for in the dark.
The various regiments did not have at their disposal either sap-
pers' tools or field telephones. The Revolutionary General Staff,
which tried to straighten out things from above, encountered
insurmountable obstacles, the greatest of which was the sabotage
of the military-technical employees.

Then we decided to appeal directly to the working class. We
stated that the success of the revolution was most seriously
threatened, and that it was for them — ^by their energy, initiative,
and self-denial — to save and strengthen the regime of proletarian
and peasant government. This appeal met with tremendous
practical success almost immediately. Thousands of workingmen
proceeded toward Kerensky's forces and began digging trenches.
The munition workers manned the cannon, themselves obtaining
ammunition for them from various stores; requisitioned horses;
brought the guns into the necessary positions and adjusted them ;
organized a commissary department; procured gasoline, motors,
automobiles; requisitioned provisions and forage; and put the
sanitary trains on a proper footing — created, in short, the entire
war machinery, which we had vainly endeavored to create from
above.

When scores of heavy guns reached the lines, the disposition
of our soldiers changed immediately. Under cover of the artil-
lery they were ready to repulse the Cossacks' attack. In the first
lines were the sailors and Red Guards. A few officers, politically
unrelated to us but sincerely attached to their regiments, accom-
panied their soldiers to the lines and directed their operations
against Krassnov's Cossacks.

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Collapse of Kerensky's Attempt

Meanwhile telegrams spread the report all over the country
and abroad that the Bolshevik "adventure" had been disposed of
and that Kerensky had entered Petrograd and was establishing
order with an iron hand. On the other hand, in Petrograd itself,
the bourgeois press, emboldened by the proximity of Kerensky's
troops, wrote about the complete demoralization of the Petro-
grad garrison; about an irresistible advance of the Cossacks,
equipped with much artillery; and predicted the imminent fall
of the Smolny Institute. Our chief handicap was, as already
stated, the lack of suitable mechanical accessories and of men
able to direct military operations. Even those officers who had
conscientiously accompanied their soldiers to the lines, declined
the position of G>mmander-in-aiief'.

After long deliberation, we hit upon the following combina-
tion: The Garrison Council selected a committee of five per-
sons, which was entrusted with the supreme control of all opera-
tions against the counter-revolutionary forces moving on Petro-
grad. This committee subsequently reached an understanding
with Colonel Muravief , who was in the opposition party under
the Kerensky rigime, and who now, on his own initiative, offered
his services to the Soviet government.

On the cold night of October 30th, Muravief and I started
by automobile for the lines. Wagons with provisions, forage,
military supplies and artillery trailed along the road. All this was
done by the workingmen of various factories. Several times our
automobile was stopped on the way by Red Guard patrols who
verified our permit. Since the first days of the October revolu-
tion, every automobile in town had been requisitioned, and no
automobile could be ridden through the streets of the city or in
the outskirts of the capital without a permit from the Smolny
Institute. The vigilance of the Red Guards was beyond all
praise. They stood on watch about small camp fires, rifle in
hand, hours at a time. The sight of these young armed work-
men by the camp fires in the snow was the best symbol of the
proletarian revolution.

Many guns had been drawn up in position, and there was no

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bck of ammunition. The decisive encounter developed on this
very day, between Krasnoye-Selo and Tsarskoye-Selo. After a
fierce artillery duel, the Cossacks, who kept on advancing as long
as they met no obstacles, hastily withdrew. They had been fooled
all the time by tales of harsh and cruel acts committed by the
Bolsheviki, who wished, as it were, to sell Russia to the German
Kaiser. They had been assured that almost the entire garrison
at Petrograd was impatiently awaiting them as deliverers. The
first serious resistance completely disorganized their ranks and
sealed the fate of Kerensky's entire undertaking.

The retreat of Krassnov's Cossacks enabled us to get control
of the radio station at Tsarskoye-Selo. We immediately wire-
lessed the news of our victory over Kerensky's forces. Our for-
eign friends informed us subsequently that the German wireless
station refused, on orders from above, to receive this wireless
message.*

♦I cite here the text of this wireless message: "Selo Pulkovo.
General Staff 2:10 P. M. The night of October 30th-31st will go down
in history. Kerensky's attempt to march counter-revolutionary forces
upon the capital of the revolution has received a decisive check.
Kerensky is retreating, we are advancing. The soldiers, sailors and
workingmen of Petrograd have shown that they can and will, gun in
hand, affirm the will and power of proletarian democracy. The bour-
geoisie tried to isolate the army of the revolution and Kerensky at-
tempted to crush it by Cossackism. Both have been frustrated.

"The great idea of the reign of a workingmen's and peasants*
democracy united the ranks of the army and hardened its will. The
whole country will now come to understand that the Soviet govern-
ment is not a passing phenomenon, but a permanent fact of the
supremacy of the workers, soldiers and peasants. Kerensky's repulse
was the repulse of the middle class, the bourgeoisie and the Kornilo-
vites. Kerensky's repulse means the affirmation of the people's rights
to a free, peaceful life, to land, food and power. The Pulkovsky divi-
sion, by their brilliant charge, is strengthening the cause of the prole-
tarian and peasant revolution. There can be no return to the past.
There is still fighting, obstacles and sacrifice ahead of us. But the
way is open and victory assured.

"Revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Government may well be
proud of their Pulkovsky division, commanded by Colonel Walden.
May the names of the fallen never be forgotten. All honor to the
fighters for the revolution — the soldiers and the officers who stood
by the People! Long live revolutionary and Socialist Russia! In the
name of the Council of People's Commissaries, L. Trotzky, Oct. 31st,
1917."

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The first reaction of the German authorities to the events of
October was thus one of fear — fear lest these events provoke
disturbances in Germany itself. In Austria-Hungary, part of
our telegram was accepted and, so far as we can tell, has been
the source of information for all Europe upon the ill-starred
attempt of Kerensky to recover his power and its miserable
failure.

Discontent was rife among Krassnov's Cossacks. They began
sending their scouts into Petrograd and even official delegates
to Smolny. There they had the opportunity to convince them-
selves that perfect order reigned in the capital, thanks to the
Petrograd garrison, which unanimously supported the Soviet
government. The Cossacks' disorganization became the more
acute as the absurdity of the plan to take Petrograd with some
lliousand horsemen dawned upon them — for the supports prom-
ised them from the front never arrived.

Krassnov's detachment withdrew to Gatchinsk, and when we
started out thither the next day, Krassnov's staff were already
virtually prisoners of the Cossacks themselves. Our Gatchinsk
garrison was holding all the most important military positions.
The Cossacks, on the other hand, though not yet disarmed, were
absolutely in no position for further resistance. They wanted
but one thing: to be allowed as soon as possible to return to the
Don region or, at feast, back to the front.

The Gatchinsk Palace presented a curious sight. At every
entrance stood a special guard, while at the gates were artillery
and armored cars. Sailors, soldiers and Red Guards occupied
the royal apartments, decorated with precious paintings. Scattered
upon the tables, made of expensive wood', lay soldiers' clothes,
pipes and empty sardine boxes. In one of the rooms General
Krassnov's staff had established itself. On the floor lay mat-
tresses, caps and greatcoats.

The representative of the Revolutionary War Committee, who
escorted us, entered the quarters of the General Staflf, noisily
dropped his rifle-butt to the floor and resting upon it, announced :
"General Krassnov, you and your staff are prisoners of the So-
viet authorities." Immediately armed Red Guards barred both
doors. Kerensky was nowhere to be seen. He had again fled, as
he had done before from the Winter Palace. As to the circum-
stances attending this flight, General Krassnov made a written

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statement on November 1st. I cite here in full this curious
document.

* :(• *

November 1st, 1917, 19 o'clock.

About 15 o'clock today, I was summoned by the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, Kerensky. He was very agitated and
nervous.

"General," said he, "you have betrayed me — ^your Cossacks
here positively say that they will arrest me and turn me over
to the sailors."

"Yes," I answered, "there is talk about it, and I know that
you have no sympathizers here at all."

"But are the officers, too, of the same mind?"

"Yes, the officers are especially dissatisfied with you."

"Then, what am I to do? I'll have to commit suicide."

"If you are an honest man, you will proceed immediately to
Petrograd under a flag of truce and report to the Revolutionary
Committee, where you will talk things over, as the head of the
Government."

"Yes, ni do that, General!"

"I will furnish a guard for you and will ask that a sailor
accompany you."

"No, anyone but a sailor. Don't you know that Dybenko is
here?"

"No, I don't know who Dybenko is."

"He is an enemy of mine."

"Well, that can't be helped. When one plays for great stakes,
he must be prepared to lose all."

"All right. Only I shall go at night."

"Why? That would be flight. Go calmly and openly, so that
everyone can see that you are fleeing."

"Well, all right. Only you must provide for me a dependable
convoy."

"All right."

I went and called out a Cossack from the 10th Don Cossack
regiment, a certain Rysskov, and ordered him to appoint eight
Cossacks to guard the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Half an hour later, the Cossacks came and reported that Ke-

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rensky had gone already — that he had fled. I gave an alarm and
ordered a search for him. I believe that he cannot have escaped
from Gatchinsk and must now be in hiding here somewhere.

Commanding the 3rd Corps,

Major-General Krassnov.
* * *

Thus, ended this undertaking.

Our opponents still would not yield, however, and did not
admit that the question of government power was settled. They
continued to base their hopes on the front. Many leaders of the
former Soviet parties — Chernoff, Tseretelli, Avksentiev, Gotz
and others — went to the front, entered into negotiations with the
old army committees, and, according to newspaper reports, tried
even in the camp, to. form a new ministry. All this came to
naught. The old army committees had lost all their significance,
and intensive work was going on at the front in connection with
the conferences and councils called for the purpose of reorganiz-
ing all army organizations. In these re-elections the Soviet Gov-
ernment was everywhere victorious.

From Gatchinsk, our divisions proceeded along the railroad
further in the direction of the Luga River and Pskov. On the
way, they met a few more trainloads of shock-troops and Cos-
sacks, which had been called out by Kerensky, or which indi-
vidual generals had sent over. With one of these echelons there
was even an armed encounter. But most of the soldiers that were
sent from the front to Petrograd declared, as soon as they met
with representatives of the Soviet forces, that they had been
deceived and that they would not lift a finger against the govern-
ment of soldiers and workingmen.

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Internal Friction

In the meantime, the struggle for Soviet control spread all over
the country. In Moscow, especially, this struggle took on an ex-
tremely protracted and bloody character. Perhaps not the least
important cause of this was the fact that the leaders of the revolt
did not at once show the necessary determination in attacking. In
civil war, more than in any other, victory can be insured onl}r by
a determined and persistent course. There must be no vacilla-
tion. To engage in parleys is dangerous ; merely to mark time is
suicidal. We are dealing here with the masses, who have never
held any power in their hands, who are therefore most wanting
in political self-confidence. Any hesitation at revolutionary head-
quarters demoralizes them immediately. It is only when a revo-
lutionary party steadily and resolutely makes for its goal, that it
can help the toilers to overcome their century-old instincts of
slavery and lead them on to victory. And only by these means
of aggressive charges can victory be achieved witii the smallest
expenditure of energy and the least ntunber of sacrifices.

But the great difficulty is to acquire such firm and positive
tactics. The people's want of confidence in their own power
and their lack of political experience are naturally reflected in
their leaders, who, in their turn, find themselves subjected, be-
sides, to the tremendous pressure of bourgeois public opinion
from above.

The liberal bourgeoisie treated with contempt and indignation
the mere idea of the possibility of a working class government
and gave free vent to their feelings on the subject, in the in-
nunfierable organs at their disposal. Close behind them trailed
the intellectuals, who, with all their professions of radicalism and
all the socialistic coating of their world-philosophy, are, in the
depths of their hearts, completely steeped in slavish worship of
bourgeois strength and administrative ability. All these ''Social-
istic" intellectuals hastily joined the Right and considered the
ever-increasing strength of the Soviet government as the clear
beginning of the end. After the representatives of the "liberal"
professions came the petty officials, the administrative tech-
nicians — all those elements which materially and spiritually sub-
sist on the crumbs that fall from the bourgeois table. The

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opposition of these elements was chiefly passive in character, espe-
cially after the crushing of the cadet insurrection ; but, neverthe-
less, it might still seem formidable. We were being denied co-
operation at every step. The government officials would either
leave the Ministry or refuse to work while remaining in it. They
would turn over neither the business of the department nor its
money accounts. The telephone operators refused to connect us,
while our messages were either held up or distorted in the tele-
graph offices. We could not get translators, stenographers or
even copyists.

All this could not fail to create such an atmosphere as led
various elements in the higher ranks of our own party to doubt
whether, in the face of a boycott by bourgeois society, the toilers
could manage to put the machinery of government in working
order and continue in power. Opinions were voiced as to the
necessity of coalition. Coalition with whom? With the liberal
bourgeoisie. But an attempt at coalition with them had driven
the revolution into a terrible morass. The revolt of the 25th of
October was an act of self-preservation on the part of the masses
after the period of impotence and treason of the leaders of coali-
tion government. There remained for us only coalition in the
ranks of so-called revolutionary democracy, that is, coalition of
all the Soviet parties.

Such a coalition we did, in fact, propose from the very begin-
ning — at the session of the Second All-Russian Council of So-
viets, on the 25th of October. The Kerensky Government had been
overthrown, and we suggested that the Council of Soviets take
the government into its own hands. But the Right parties with-
drew, slamming the door after them. And this was the best thing
they could have done. They represented an insignificant section
of the Council. They no longer had any following in the masses,
and those classes which still supported them out of mere inertia,
were coming over to our side more and more. Coalition with the
Right Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki could not
broaden the social basis of the Soviet government; and would,
at the same time, introduce into the composition of this govern-
ment elements which were completely disintegrated by political
skepticism and idolatry of the liberal bourgeoisie. The whole
strength of the new government lay in the radicalism of its pro-
gram and the boldness of its actions. To tie itself up with the
Chernofi and Tseretelli factions would mean to bind the new
government hand and foot — to deprive it of freedom of action

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and thereby forfeit the confidence of the masses in the shortest
possible time.

Our nearest political neighbors to the Right were the so-
called ''Left Social Revolutionists." They were, in general, quite
ready to support us, but endeavored, nevertheless, to form a
coalition Socialist government. The management of the railroad
union (the so-called vikzhal), the Central Committee of the
Postal Telegraph employees, and the Union of Government Offi-
cials were all against us. And in the higher circles of our own
party, voices were being raised as to the necessity of reaching an
understanding with these organizations, one way or another. But
on what basis? All the above-mentioned controlling organiza-
tions of the old period had outlived their usefulness. They bore
approximately the same relation to the entire lower personnel as
diid the old army committees to the masses of soldiers in the
trenches. History has created a big gulf between the higher
classes and the lower. Unprincipled combinations of these lead-
ers of another day — ^leaders made antiquated by the revolution —
were doomed to inevitable failure. It was necessary to depend
wholly and confidently upon the masses in order, jointly with
them, to overcome the sabotage and the aristocratic pretensions
cf the upper classes.

We left it to the Left Social-Revolutionists to continue the
hopeless efforts for coalition. Our policy was, on the contrary, to
line up the toiling lower classes against the representatives of
organizations which supported the Kerensky regime. This un-
compromising policy caused considerable friction and even divi-
sion in the upper circles of our party. In the Central Executive
Committee, the Left Social Revolutionists protested against the
severity of our measures and insisted upon the necessity for com-
promises. They met with support on the part of some of the
Bolsheviki. Three People's Commissaries gave up their port-
folios and left the government. A few other party leaders sided
with them in principle. This created a very deep impression in
intellectual and bourgeois circles. If the Bolsheviki could not be
defeated by the cadets and Krassnov's Cossacks, thought they,
it is quite clear that the Soviet government must now perish as a
result of internal dissension. However, the masses never noticed
tliis dissension at all. They unanimously supported the Soviet
of People's Commissaries, not only against counter-revolutionary
instigators and sabotagers but also against the coalitionists and
the skeptics.

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The Fate of the Constituent Assembly

When, after the Korniloff episode, the ruling Soviet par-
ties tried to smooth over their laxness toward the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie, they demanded a speedier convoca-
tion of the Constituent Assembly. Kerensky, whom the
Soviets had just saved from the too light embraces of his ally,
Korniloff, found himself compelled to make compromises.
The call for the Constituent Assembly was issued for the end
of November. By that time, however, circumstances had so
shaped themselves that there was no guarantee whatever that
the Constituent Assembly would really be convoked.

The greatest degree of disorganization was taking place
at the front. Desertions were increasing every day; the
masses of soldiers threatened to leave the trenches, whole
regiments at a time, and move to the rear, devastating every-
thing on their way. In the villages, a general seizure of lands
and landholders' utensils was going on. Martial law had been
declared in several provinces. The Germans continued to
advance, captured Riga, and threatened Petrograd. The right
wing of the bourgeoisie was openly rejoicing over the danger
that threatened the revolutionary capital. The government
offices at Petrograd were being evacuated, and Kerensky's
government was preparing to move to Moscow. All this made
the actual convocation of the Constituent Assembly not only
doubtful, but hardly even probable. From this point of view,
the October revolution seems to have been the deliverance of
the Constituent Assembly, as it has been the savior of the
Revolution generally. When we were declaring that the road
to the Constituent Assembly was not by way of Tseretelli's
Preliminary Parliament, but by way of the seizure of the
reigns of government by the Soviets, . we were quite sincere.

But the interminable delay in convoking the Constituent
Assembly was not without effect upon this institution itself.
Heralded in the first days of the revolution, it came into being
only after eight or nine months of bitter class and party strug-
gle. It came too late to play a creative role. Its internal

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inadequacy had been predetermined by a single fact — a fact
which might seem unimportant at first, but which subse-
quently took on tremendous importance for the fate of the Con-
stituent Assembly.

Numerically, the principal revolutionary party in the first
epoch was the party of Social-Revolutionists. I have already
referred to its formlessness and variegated composition. The
revolution led inevitably to the dismemberment of such of its
members as had joined it under the banner of populism. The
left wing, which had a following among part of the workers
and the vast masses of poor peasants, was becoming more
and more alienated from the rest. This wing found itself in
uncompromising opposition to the party and middle bourgeois
branches of Social Revolutionists. But the inertness of party
organization and party tradition held back the inevitable
process of cleavage. The proportional system of elections
still holds full sway, as every one knows, in party lists. Since
these lists were made up two or three months before the
October revolution and were not subject to change, the Left
and the Right Social Revolutionists still figured in these lists
as one and the same party. Thus, by the time of the .October
revolution — that is, the period when the Right Social Revo-
lutionists were arresting the Left and then the Left were
combining with the Bolsheviki for the overthrow of Kerensky's
ministry, the old lists remained in full force; and in the
elections for the Constituent Assembly the peasants were
compelled to vote for lists of names at the head of which stood
Kerensky, followed by those of Left Social Revolutionists who
participated in the plot for his overthrow.

If the months preceding the October revolution were
months of continuous gain in popular support for the Left —
of a general increase in Bolshevik following among workers,
soldiers and peasants — then this process was reflected
within the party of Social Revolutionists in an increase of
the left wing at the expense of the right. Nevertheless, on
the party lists of the Social Revolutionists there was a pre-
dominance of three to one of old leaders of the right wing —
of men who had lost all their revolutionary reputation in the
days of coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie.

To this should be added also the fact that the elections

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themselves were held during the first weeks after the October
revolution. The news of the change traveled rather slowly
from the capital to the provinces, from the cities to the villages.
The peasantry in many places had but a very vague idea of
what was taking place in Petrograd and Moscow. They
voted for *'Land and Liberty," for their representatives in the
land committees, who ia most cases gathered under the ban-
ner of populism: but thereby they were voting for Kerensky
and Avksentiev, who were dissolving the land committees,
and arresting their members. As a result of this, there came about
the strange political paradox that one of the two parties which
dissolved the Constituent Assembly — the Left Social-Revolution-
ists — had won its representation by being on the same list of
names with the party which gave a majority to the Constituent
Assembly. This matter-of-fact phase of the question should
give a very clear idea of the extent to which the Constituent
Assembly lagged behind the course of political events and
party groupings.

We must consider the question of principles.

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The Principles of Democracy and Proletarian
Dictatorship

As Marxists, we have never been idol-worshippers of formal
democracy. In a society of classes, democratic institutions not
only do not eliminate class struggle, but also give to class interests
an utterly imperfect expression. The propertied classes always
have at their disposal tens and hundreds of means for falsifying,
subverting and violating the will of the toilers. And democratic
institutions become a still less perfect medium for the expression
of the class struggle under revolutionary circumstances. Marx
called revolutions "the locomotives of history." Owing to the
open and direct struggle for power, the working people acquire
much political experience in a short time and pass rapidly from
one stage to the next in their development. The ponderous
machinery of democratic institutions lags behind this evolution
all the more, the bigger the country and the less perfect its tech-
nical apparatus.

The majority in the Constituent Assembly proved to be Social
Revolutionists, and, according to parliamentary rules of pro-
cedure, the control of the government belonged to them. But the
party of Right Social Revolutionists had a chance to acquire con-
trol during the entire pre-October period of the revolution. Yet,
they avoided the responsibilities of government, leaving the lion's
share of it to the liberal bourgeoisie. By this very course the
Right Social Revolutionists lost the last vestiges of their influence
wiUi the revolutionary elements by the time the numerical compo-
sition of the Constituent Assembly formally obliged them to form
a government. The working class, as well as the Red Guards,
were very hostile to the party of Right Social Revolutionists. The
vast majority of soldiers supported the Bolsheviki. The revolu-
tionary element in the provinces divided their sympathies be-
tween the Left Social Revolutionists and the Bolsheviki. The
sailors, who had played such an important role in revolutionary
events, were almost unanimously on our side. The Right Social
Revolutionists, moreover, had to leave the Soviets, which in
October — ^that is, before the convocation of the Constituent

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Assembly — ^had taken the government into their own hands. On
whom, then, could a ministry formed by the Constituent
Assembly's majority depend for support? It would be backed
by the upper classes in the provinces, the intellectuals, the govern-
ment officials, and temporarily by the bourgeoisie on the Right.
But such a government would lack all the material means of
administration. At such a political center as Petrograd, it would
encounter irresistible opposition from the very start. If under
these circumstances the Soviets, submitting to the formal logic
of democratic conventions, had turned the government over to the
party of Kerensky and Chernov, such a government, compro-
mised and debilitated as it was, would only introduce temporary
confusion into the political life of the country, and would be
overthrown by a new uprising in a few weeks. The Soviets
decided to reduce this belated historical experiment to its lowest
terms, and dissolved the Constituent Assembly the very first
day it met.

For this, our party has been most severely censured. The
dispersal of the Constituent Assembly has also created a decidedly
unfavorable impression among the leading circles of the European
Socialist parties. Kautsky has explained, in a series of articles
written with his characteristic pedantry, the interrelation existing
between the Social-Revolutionary problems of the proletariat and
the regime of political democracy. He tries to prove that for the
working class it is always expedient, in the long run, to preserve
the essential elements of the democratic order. This is, of course,
true as a general rule. But Kautsky has reduced this historical
truth to professorial banality. If, in the final analysis, it is^o the
advantage of the proletariat to introduce its class struggle and
even its dictatorship, through the channels of democratic institu-
tions, it does not at all follow that history always affords it the
opportunity for attaining this happy consummation. There is
nothing in the Marxian theory to warrant the deduction that his-
tory always creates such conditions as are most "favorable" to
the proletariat.

It is difficult to tell now how the course of the Revolution
would have run if the Constituent Assembly had been convoked
in its second or third month. It is quite probable that the then
dominant Social Revolutionary and Menshevik parties would
have compromised themselves, together with the Constituent
Assembly, in the eyes of not only the more active elements sup-

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porting the Soviets, but also of the more backward democratic
masses, who might have been attached, through their expectations
not to the side of the Soviets, but to that of the Constituent
Assembly. Under such circumstances the dissolution of the Con-
stituent Assembly might have led to new elections, in which the
party of the Left could have secured a majority. But the course
of events has been different. The elections for the Constituent
Assembly occurred in the ninth month of the Revolution, By
that time the class struggle had assumed such intensity that it
broke the formal frames of democracy by sheer internal force.

The proletariat drew the army and the peasantry after it.
These classes were in a state of direct and bitter war with the
Right Social Revolutionists. This party, owing to the clumsy
electoral democratic machinery, received a majority in the Con-
stituent Assembly, reflecting the pre-October epoch of the revo-
lution. The result was a contradiction which was absolutely
irreducible within the limits of formal democracy. And only
political pedants who do not take into account the revolutionary
logic of class relations, can, in the face of the post-October situa-
tion, deliver futile lectures to the proletariat on the benefits and
advantages of democracy for the cause of the class struggle.

The question was put by history far more concretely and
sharply. The Constituent Assembly, owing to the character of
its majority, was bound to turn over the government to the Cher-
nov, Kerensky and Tseretelli group. JDould this group have guided
the destinies of the Revolution? Could it have found support in
that class which constitutes the backbone of the Revolution? No.
The real kernel of the class revolution has come into irreconcil-
able conflict with its democratic shell. By this situation the fate
of the Constituent Assembly had been sealed. Its dissolution
became the only possible surgical remedy for the contradiction,
which had been created, not by us, but by all the preceding course
of events.

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Peace Negotiations

At the historic night session of the Second All-Russian
Congress of the Soviets the decree on peace was adopted.
(The full text is printed in the Appendix.) At that moment
the Soviet government was only becoming established in the im-
portant centers of the country and there was very little confidence
abroad in its power. The Soviet adopted the decree unani-
mously. But this seemed to many no more than a political
demonstration. Those who were for a compromise preached
at every opportunity that our resolution would bring no re-
sults: for, on the one hand, the German imperialists would
not recognize and would not deal with us ; on the other hand,
our Allies would declare war upon us as soon as we should
start negotiating a separate peace. Under the shadow of
these predictions we took our first steps to secure a general
democratic peace. The decree was adopted on the 26th of
October, when Kerensky and Krassnov were at the gates of
Petrograd. On the 7th of November, we addressed by wire-
less an invitation to our Allies and enemies to conclude a
general peace. In reply the Allied Governments addressed to
General Dtikhonin, then commander-in-chief, through their
military attaches, a communication stating that further steps
to separate p^ace negotiations would lead to the gravest con-
sequences. To this protest we answered the 11th of Novem-
ber by appealing to all the workers, soldiers and peasants. In
this appeal we declared that under no circumstances would we
permit our army to shed its blood under the club of the for-
eign bourgeoisie. We swept aside the threat of the Western
imperialists and took upon ourselves the responsibility for
our peace policy before the international working class. First
of all, we published, in accordance with our promises, made
as a matter of principle, the secret treaties and declared that
we would relinquish everything in these treaties that was
against the interests of the masses of the people in all coun-
tries. The capitalist governments made an attempt to make
use of our disclosures against one another, but the masses of
the people understood and recognized us. Not a single social

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patriotic publication, as far as we know, dared to protest
against having all the methods of diplomacy radically changed
by a government of peasants and workers; they dared not pro-
test against us for denouncing the dishonest cunning, chican-
ery and cheating of the old diplomacy. We made it the task
of our diplomacy to enlighten the masses of the peoples, to
open their eyes to the real meaning of the policy of their gov-
ernments, in order to weld them together in a common strug-
gle and a common hatred against the bourgeois capitalist
order. The German bourgeois press accused us of "dragging
on" the peace negotiations ; but all nations anxiously followed
the. discussions at Brest-Litovsk, and in this way we rendered,
during the two months and a half of peace negotiations, a
service to the cause of peace which was recognized even by
the more honest of our enemies. The question of peace was
first put before the world in a shape which made it impossible
to side-track it any longer by machinations behind the scenes.
On the 22nd of November a truce was signed to discontinue
military activities on the entire front from the Baltic to the
Black Sea. Once more we requested our Allies to join us and
to conduct together with us the peace negotiations. There
was no reply, though this time the Allies did not again at-
tempt to frighten us by threats. The peace negotiations were
started December 9th, a month and a half after the peace
decree was adopted. The accusations of the purchased press
and of the social-traitor press that we had made no attempt to
agree with our Allies on a common policy was therefore en-
tirely false. For a month and a half we kept our Allies in-
formed about every step we made and always called upon
them to become a party to the peace negotiations. Our con-
science is clear before the peoples of France, Italy and Great
Britain We did all in our power to get all the belliger-
ents to join the peace negotiations. If we were compelled to
start separate peace negotiations, it was not because of any
fault of ours, but because of the Western imperialists, as well
as those of the Russian parties, which continued predicting
the approaching destruction of the workmen's and peasants'
government of Russia and who persuaded the Allies not to
pay serious attention to our peace initiative. But be that as it
may, on the 9th of December the peace conversations were
started. Our delegation made a statement of principles which

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set forth the basis of a general democratic peace in the exact
expressions of the decree of the 26th of October (8th of No-
vember). The other side demanded that the session be broken
off, and the reopening of the sessions was later, at the
suggestion of Kuehlmann, repeatedly delayed. It was clear
that the delegation of the Teuton Allies experienced no small
difficulty in the formulation of its reply to our delegation.
On the 25th of December this reply was given. The diplomats
of the Teuton Allies expressed agreement with our democratic
formula of peace without annexations and indemnities, on the
basis of self-determination of peoples. We saw clearly that
this was but pretense ; but we had not expected even that they
would try to pretend; because, as the French writer has said,
hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. The fact that
the German imperialists found it necessary to make this
tribute to the principles of democracy, was, in our eyes, evi-
dence that the situation of affairs within Germany was serious

enough But if we, generally speaking, had no illusions

concerning the love for democracy of Messrs. Kuehlmann and
Czemin — we know well enough the nature of the German
and Austro-Hungarian dominating classes — it must neverthe-
less be admitted that we had not the slightest idea of the
chasm which separated the real intentions of German imperial-
ism from those principles which were put forth on the 25th of
December by Mr. von Kuehlmann as a parody on the Russian
revolution — a chasm which was revealed so strikingly a few
days later. Such audacity we had never expected.

Kuehlmann's reply made a tremendous impression upon
the working masses of Russia. It was interpreted as a result
of the fear felt by the dominant classes of the Central Empires
because of the discontent and the growing impatience of the
working masses of Germany. On the 28th of December there
took place in Petrograd a joint demonstration of workmen and
soldiers for a democratic peace. The next morning our dele-
gation came back from Brest-Litovsk and brought those brig-
and demands which Mr. von Kuehlmann made to us in the
name of the Central Empires as an interpretation of his
"democratic" formulae.

At the first glance it may seem incomprehensible why the
German diplomacy should have presented its democratic for-

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mulae if it intended within two or three days to disclose its
wolfish apetite. What was it that the German diplomacy
expected to bring about? At least, the theoretic discussions
which developed around the democratic formulae, owing
largely to the initiative of Kuehlmann himself, were not with-
out their danger. That the diplomacy of the Central Empires
could not reap many laurels in that way must have been clear
beforehand to that diplomacy itself. But the secret of the
conduct of the diplomacy of Kuehlmann consisted in that that
gentleman was sincerely convinced of our readiness to play a
four-handed game with him. His way of reasoning was ap-
proximately as follows: Russia needs peace. The Bolsheviki
got the power because of their struggle for peace. The Bol-
sheviki desire to remain in power and this is possible for
them only on condition that peace is concluded. It is true
that they bound themselves to a definite democratic program
of peace, but why do diplomats exist if not for the purpose
of making black look white? We Germans will make it easier
for the Bolsheviki by covering our plunders by democratic
tormulas. The Bolshevist diplomacy will have plenty of rea-
son not to dig for the political essence of the matter, or, rather,
not to expose to the entire world the contents of the enticing

formulae In other words, Kuehlmann relied upon a

silent agreement with us. He would return to us our fine
formulas and we should give him a chance to get provinces
and peoples for Germany without a protest. In the eyes of
the German workers, the annexations by force would thus
• receive the sanction of the Russian Revolution. When dur-
ing the discussions, we showed that with us, it was not a matter
of empty words or of camouflaging a conspiracy concluded be-
hind the scenes, but a matter of democratic principles for the
international life of the community of nations, Kuehlmann
took it as a willful and malicious breaking of the silent agree-
ment. He would not by any means recede from the position
taken in the formulas of the 2Sth of December. Relying upon
his cunning, bureaucratic and judicial logic, he tried in the
face of the entire world to show that white is in no way different
from black, and it was our own perverseness which made us insist
that there was such a diflference. Count Czemin, the repre-
sentative of Austria-Hungary, played a part in those negotia-
tions which no one would consider inspiring or satisfactory.

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He was an awkward second and upon instructions from
Kuehlmann took it upon himself in all critical moments to
utter the most extreme and cynical declarations. General
Hoffmann brought a refreshing note into the negotiations.
Showing no great sympathy for the diplomatic constructions
of Kuehlmann, the General several times put his soldierly boot
upon the table, around which a complicated judicial debate
was developing. We, on our part, did not doubt for a single
minute that just this boot of General Hoffmann was the only
element of serious reality in these negotiations. The important
trump in the hands of Mr. Kuehlmann was the participation
in the negotiations of a delegation of the Kiev Rada. For
the Ukrainian middle classes, who had seized the power, the
most important factor seemed to be the "recognition" of their
government by the capitalist governments of Europe. At first
the Rada placed itself at the disposal of the Allied imperialists,
received from them some pocket money, and immediately
thereupon sent their representatives to . Brest-Litovsk in order
to make a bargain behind the back of the Russian people with
the government of Austria-Hungary for the recognition of the
legitimate birth of their government. They had hardly taken
this first step on the road to "international" existence, when
the Kiev diplomacy revealed the same narrow-mindedness
and the same moral standards which were always so char-
acteristic of the petty politicians of the Balkan Peninsula.
Messrs. Kuehlmann and Czernin certainly had no illusions
concerning the solidity of the new participant in the negotia-
tions. But they thought, and correctly so, that the partici-
pation of the Kiev delegation complicated the game not with-
out advantage for themselves.

At its first appearance at Brest-Litovsk, the Kiev delega-
tion characterized Ukraine as a component part of the Russian
Federated Republic that was in progress of formation. This
apparently embarrassed the diplomats of the Central Empires,
who considered it their main task to convert the Russian Re-
public into a new Balkan Peninsula. At their second appear-
ance the delegates of the Rada declared, under dictation from
the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, that Ukraine refused to
join the Russian Federation and was becoming an entirely
independent republic. In order to give the reader an oppor-
tunity to get a better idea of the situation which was thus

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cheated for the Soviet power m the last moment of the peace
negotiations, I think it best to reproduce here in its basic
parts the address made by the author of these lines in his
capacity as the People's Commissar on Foreign Affairs at the
session of the Central Executive Committee on the 14th of
February, 1918.

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Address of the Peoples Commissar on Foreign Affairs

Comrades: Upon Soviet Russia has fallen the task not
only to construct the new but also to recapitulate the old to
a certain degree, or, rather, to a very large degree — to pay
all bills, first of all the bills of the war, which has lasted three
and a half years. The war put the economic power of the
belligerent countries to a severe test. The fate of Russia, a
poor, backward country, in a protracted war was predeter-
mined. In the teiTible collision of the military machines the
determining factor, after all is said and done, is the ability
of the country to adapt its industries to the military needs,
to rebuild it on the shortest notice and to produce in continu-
ously increasing quantities the weapons of destruction which
are used up at such an enormous rate during this massacre of
peoples. Almost every country, including the most back-
ward, could and did have powerful weapons of destruction
at the beginning of the war; that is, it obtained them from
foreign countries. That is what all the backward countries
did, and so did Russia. But the war speedily wears out its
dead capital, demanding that it be continuously replenished.
The military power of every single country drawn into the
whirlpool of the world massacre was, as a matter of fact,
measured by its ability to produce independently and during
the war itself, its cannons and shells and the other weapons
of destruction.

If the war had decided the problem of the balance of
power in a very short time, Russia might conceivably have
turned out to be on that side of the trenches which
victory favored. But the war dragged along for a long time,
and it was not an accident that it did so. The fact alone that
the international politics were for the last fifty years reduced
to the construction of the so-called European "balance of
power," that is, to a. state in which the hostile powers ap-
proximately balance one another, this fact alone was bound —
when the power and wealth of the present bourgeois nations
is considered — ^to make it a war of an extremely protracted

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character. That meant;, first of all the exhaustion of the
weaker and economically less developed countries.

The most powerful country in a military sense proved to
be Germany, because of the strength of the industries and
because of their modern and rational construction as against
the archaic construction of the German State. France, with
its undeveloped state of capitalism, proved to be far behind
Germany, and even such a powerful colonial power as Great
Britain, owing to the conservative and routine character of
the English industries, proved to be weaker that Germany.
When history put before the Russian Revolution the question
of the peace negotiations, we had no doubt that in these nego-
tiations, and so long as the decisive power of the revolutionary
proletariat of the world had not interfered, we should be com-
pelled to stand the bill of three and a half years of war. There
was no doubt in our minds that in the person of the German
imperialism we were dealing with an opponent who was sat-
urated with the consciousness of his immense power, which
was strikingly revealed during the present war.

All the arguments made by bourgeois clique^ that we
might have been incomparably stronger if we had conducted
these negotiations together with our allies are absolutely
without foundation. In order that we might at an indefinite
future date conduct negotiations together with our Allies, we
should first of all have had to continue the war together with
them. And if our country was weakened and exhausted, the con-
tinuation of the war, a failure to bring it to a conclusion, would
have still further weakened and exhausted it. We should have
had to settle the war under conditions still more unfavorable to
us. In the case even that the combination of which Russia, owing
to international intrigues of Czarism and the bourgeoisie,
had become a part — the combination headed by Great Britain
— in the case even that this combination had come out of the
war completely victorious — let us for a moment admit the
possibility of such a not very probable issue — even in that case,
comrades, it does not mean that our country would also have
come out victorious. For during further continuation of this
protracted war, Russia would have become even more exhausted
and plundered than now. The masters of that combination,
who would concentrate in their hands the fruits of the victory,

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that is, Great Britain and America, would have displayed
toward our country the same methods which were displayed
by Germany during the peace negotiations. It would be ab-
surd and childish to appraise the politics of the imperialistic
countries from the point of view of any considerations other
than those considerations of naked interests and material
power. Consequently, if we, as a nation are at present weak-
ened before the imperialism of the world, we are weakened,
not because of extricating ourselves from the fiery ring of
the war, having already previously extricated ourselves from
the shackles of international military obligations: no! we
are weakened by that very policy of the Czarists and the
bourgeois classes, which we, as a revolutionary party, have
always fought against before this war and during this war.

You remember, comrades, under what conditions our dele-
gation went to Brest-Litovsk last time, right after one of the
sessions of the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviets.
At that session, we reported on the state of the negotiations',
and the demands of our opponents. These demands, as you
remember, were really no more than n\asked, or, rather, half-
masked annexationist aspirations at the expense of Lithuania,
Courland," a part of Livonia, the Isles of Moon Sound, as well
as a half-masked demand for a punitive war indemnity which
we then estimated would amount to six, eight or even ten
milliards oif rubles. During interruption of the sessions,
which continued for about ten days, a considerable disturb-
ance took place in Austria-Hungary; strikes of masses of
workers broke out, and these strikes were the first recogni-
tion of our methods of conducting peace negotiations that we
met with from the proletariat of the Central Empires, as
against the annexationist demands of the German militarism.
We promised here no miracles but we did say that the road
we were pursuing was the only road remaining to the revo-
lutionary democracy for securing the possibility of its further
development.

There is room for complaint that the proletariat of the
other countries, and particularly of the Central Empires, is
too slow to enter the road of open revolutionary struggle,
yes, it must be admitted that the pace of its development is
all too slow — ^but, nevertheless, there could be observed a

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movement in Austria-Hungary which swept the entire state
and which was a direct echo of the Brest-Litovsk negotia-
tions.

Leaving for Brest-Litovsk, it was our common opinion
that there was no ground to believe that just this wave would
sweep away the Austro-German militarism. If we had been
convinced that this could be expected, we would gladly have
given the promise that several persons demanded from us,
namely, that under no circumstances would we sign a sepa-
rate peace with Germany. I said at that very time, that we
could not make such a promise, for it would amount to taking
upon ourselves the obligation of vanquishing the German
militarism. The secret of attaining such a victory was not
in our possession. And inasmuch as we would not undertake
the obligation to change the balance of the world powers at
a moment's notice, we frankly and openly declared that
revolutionary power may under certain conditions be com-
pelled to agree to an annexationist peace. A revolutionary
power would fall short of its high principles only in the event
that it should attempt to conceal from its own people the
predatory character of the peace, but by no means, however,
in the event that the course of the struggle should compel it
to adopt such a peace.

At the same time, we indicated that we were leaving to
continue negotiations under conditions which were seem-
ingly improving for us and becoming worse for our enemies,
We observed the movement in Austria-Hungary, and there
were signs indicating (this was made the basis for state-
ments by representatives of the German Social Democracy
in the Reichstag) that Germany was on the eve of similar
events. We went with this hope. During the first days of
this visit to Brest-Litovsk the wireless brought us from Vilna
the first news that in Berlin an enormous strike movement
was developing; this movement as well as that of Austria-
Hungary was directly connected with the course of negotia-
tions in Brest. However, as is often the case, by reason of
the dialectic of the class struggle, just this conspicuous be-
ginning of the proletarian rising, which surpassed anything
Germany had ever seen, was bound to push the property
classes to a closer consolidation and to greater hostility

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against the proletariat. The German dominating classes are
saturated with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preserva-
tion to understand that concessions in such an exigency as
they were in, under the pressure of the masses of their own
people — concessions however small — would amount to cap-
itulation before the idea of the revolution. That is why, after
the first moment of perplexity and panic, the time when
Kuehlmann deliberately dragged out the negotiations by minor
and formal questions, had passed — as soon as the strikes
were disposed of, as soon as he came to the conclusion that
for the time being no imminent danger threatened his mas-
ters, he again changed front and adopted a tone of unlimited
self-confidence and aggression.

Our negotiations were complicated by the participation
of the Kiev Rada. We called attention to this last time, too.
The delegation from the Kiev Rada appeared at a time when
the Rada represented a fairly strong organization in the
Ukraine and when the way out of the war had not yet been
predetermined. Just at that time, we made the Rada an of-
facial offer to conclude a definite treaty with us, making as
one of the conditions of such a treaty the following demand:
that the Rada declare Kaledin and Korniloff to be counter-
revolutionists and put no hindrance in the way of our waging
war on these two leaders. The delegation from the Kiev
Rada arrived, just when we hoped to reach an understanding
with it on these matters. We declared that as long as the
people of the Ukraine recognized the Rada, we considered its
independent participation in these negotiations permissible.
But with the further development of events in Russian terri-
tory and in the Ukraine, and the more the antagonism be-
tween the Ukrainian masses and the Rada increased, the
greater became the Rada's readiness to conclude any kind of
treaty with the governments of the Central Empires, and, if
need be, to drag German imperialism into the internal affairs
of the Russian Republic, in order to support the Rada against
the Russian revolution.

On the 9th day of February (N. S.) we learned that the
peace negotiations carried on behind our backs between the
Rada and the Central Powers, had been signed. The 9th of
February happened to be the birthday of Leopold of Bavaria,

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and, as is the custom in monarchical countries, the triumphant
historical act was timed — with or without the consent of the
Kiev Rada for this festive day. General Hoffmann had a
salute fired in honor of Leopold of Bavaria, having previously-
asked permission to do so of the Kiev delegation, since by
the treaty of peace Brest-Litovsk had been ceded to Ukraine.

Events had taken such a turn, however, that at the time
General Hoffmann was asking permission for a military salute,
the Kiev Rada had but very little territory left outside of
Brest-Litovsk. On the strength of the telegrams we had
received from Petrograd, we officially made it known to the
Central Powers' delegation that the Kiev Rada no longer
existed, a circumstance which certainly had some bearing on
the course of the peace negotiations. We suggested to Count
Czernin that his representatives accompany our officers into
Ukrainian territory to ascertain whether the Kiev Rada ex-
isted or not. Czernin seemed to welcome this suggestion,
but when we asked him if this meant that the treaty made
with the Kiev delegation would not be signed before the re-
turn of his own mission, he hesitated and promised to ask
Kuehlmann about it. Having inquired, he sent us an answer
in the negative.

This was on February 8th. By the 9th, they had to sign
the treaty. This could not be delayed, not only on account of
Leopold's birthday, but for a more important reason, which
Kuehlmann undoubtedly explained to Czernin : "If we should
send our representatives into the Ukraine just now, they
might really convince themselves that the Rada does not
exist; and then we shall have to face a single All-Russian
delegation which would spoil our prospects in the negotia-
tions." ... By the Austro-Hungarian delegation we were
advised to put principle aside and to place the question on a
more practical plane. Then the German delegation would

be disposed to concessions It was unthinkable that the

Germans should decide to continue the war over, say, the
Moon Islands, if you put this demand in concrete form.

We replied that we were ready to look into such con-
cessions as their German colleagues were prepared to make.
"So far we have been contending for the self-determination

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of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians, Letts, Esthonians, and
other peoples; and on all these issues you have told us that
such self-determination is out of the question. Now let us
see what your plans are in regard to the self'-determination
of another people — ^the Russians ; what designs and plans of a
military strategic nature are behind your seizure of the Moon
Islands. For these islands, as an integral part of an inde-
pendent Esthonian Republic, or as a possesion of the Feder-
ated Russian Republic would have only a defensive military
importance, while in the hands of Germany they would as-
sume offensive significance, menacing the most vital centers
of our country, and especially Petrograd."

But, of course, Hoffmann would make no concessions
whatsoever. Then the hour for reaching a decision had come.
We could not declare war, for we were too weak. The army
had lost all of its internal ties. In order to save our country,
to overcome this disorganization, it was imperative to estab-
lish the internal coherence of the toilers. This psychological
tie can only be created by constructive work in factory, field
and workshop. We had to return the masses of laborers, who
had been subjected to great and intense suffering — ^who had
experienced catastrophes in the war — to the fields and fac-
tories, where they must find themselves again and get a foot-
ing in the labor world, and rebuild internal discipline. This
was the only way to save the country, which was now aton-
ing for the sins of Czarism and the bourgeoisie. We had to
get out of the war and withdraw the army from the slaughter
house. Nevertheless, we threw this in the face of the German
militarism: The peace you are forcing down our throats is
a peace of aggression and robbery. We cannot permit you,
Messrs. Diplomats, to say to the German workingmen : "You
have characterized our demands as avaricious, as annexation-
ist. But look, under these very demands we have brought
you the signature of the Russian revolution." Yes, we are
weak, we cannot fight at present. But we have sufficient
revolutionary courage to say that we shall not willingly affix
our signature to the treaty which you are writing with the
sword on the body of living peoples. We refused to affix our
signature. I believe we acted properly, comrades.

I do not mean to say, friends, that a German advance

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upon Russia is out of the question. It were too rash to make
such an asserton in view of the great strengfth of the German
imperialistic party. But I do believe that the stand we have
taken in the matter has rendered it far more difficult for Ger-
man militarism to advance upon us. What would happen if it
should advance? To this there is but one thing to say: If it
is possible in our country, a country completely exhausted
and in a state of desperation, to raise the spirits of the more
revolutionary energetic elements; if a struggle in defence of
our Revolution and the territory comprised within it is still
possible, then this is the case only as a result of our abandon-
ing the war and refusing to sign the peace treaty.

The Second War and the Signing of Peace

During the first few days following the breaking off of
negotiations the German government hesitated, not knowing
what course to pursue. The politicians and diplomats evi-
dently thought that the principal objects had been accom-
plished and that there was no reason for coveting our sig-
natures. The military men were ready, in any event, to break
through the lines drawn by the German Government at Brest-
Litovsk. Professor Krigge, the advisor of the German dele-
gation, told a member of our delegation that a German
invasion of Russia under the existing conditions was out
of the question. Count Mirbach, then at the head of
the German missions at Petrograd, went to Berlin with the
assurance that an agreement concerning the exchange of
prisoners of war had been satisfactorily reached. But all this
did not in the least prevent General Hoffmann from declaring
on the fifth day after the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had
been broken oflf — that the armistice was over, antedating the
seven-day period from the time of the last Brest-Litovsk
session. It were really out of place to dilate here on the
moral indignation caused by this piece of dishonesty. It fits
in perfectly with the general state of diplomatic and military
morality of the ruling classes.

The new German invasion developed under circumstances
most fatal for Russia. Instead of the week's notice agreed
upon, we received notice only two days in advance. This

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circumstance intensified the panic in the army which was
already in state of chronic dissolution. Resistance was almost
unthinkable. The soldiers could not believe that the Ger-
mans would advance after we had declared the state of war
at an end. The panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of
such individual detachments as were ready to make a stand.
In the workingmen's quarters of Petrograd and Moscow, the
indignation against the treacherous and truly murderous Ger-
man invasion reached a pitch of greatest intensity. In these
alarming days and nights, the workers were ready to enlist
in the army by the ten thousand. But the matter of organizing
lagged far behind. Isolated tenacious detachments full of
enthusiasm became convinced themselves of their instability
in their first serious clashes with German regulars. This still
further lowered the country's spirits. The old army had long
ago been hopelessly defeated and was going to pieces, block-
ing all the roads and byways. The new army, owing to the
country's general exhaustion, the fearful disorganization of
industries and the means of transportation, was being got
together too slowly. Distance was the only serious obstacle
in the way of the German invasion.

The chief attention of the Austro-Hungarian government
was centered on the Ukraine. The Rada, through its delega-
tion, had appealed to the governments of the Central Empires
for direct military aid against the Soviets, which had by that
time completely defeated the Ukrainians. Thus did the petty-
bourgeois democracy of the Ukraine, in its struggle against
the working class and the destitute peasants, voluntarily open
the gates to foreign invasion.

At the same time, the Svinhufvud government was seeking
the aid of German bayonets against the Finnish proletariat.
German militarism, openly and before the whole world, as-
sumed the role of executioner of the peasant and proletarian
revolution in Russia.

In the ranks of our party hot debates were being carried
on as to whether or not we should, under these circumstances,
yield to the German ultimatum and sig^ a new treaty, which
— and this no one doubted — would include conditions incom-
parably more onerous than those announced at Brest-Litovsk.
The representatives of the one view held that just now, with

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the German intervention in the internal war of the Russian
Republic, it was impossible to establish peace for one part of
Russia and remain passive, while in the South and in the
North, German forces would be establishing a regime of
bourgeois dictatorship. Another view, championed chiefly by
Lenin, was that every delay, even the briefest breathing spell,
would greatly help the internal stabilization and increase the
Russian powers of resistance. After the whole country and
the whole world had come to know of our absolute helpless-
ness against foreign invasion at this time, the conclusion of
peace would everywhere be understood as an act forced upon
us by the cruel law of disproportionate forces. It would be
childish to argue from the standpoint of abstract revolution-
ary ethics. The point is not to die with honor but to achieve
ultimate victory. The Russian Revolution wants to survive,
must survive, and must by every means at its disposal avoid
fighting an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the
Western revolutionary movement will come to its aid.

German imperialism is still engaged in a fierce annexa-
tionist struggle with English and American militarism. Only
because of this is the conclusion of peace between Russia and
Germany at all possible. We must fully avail ourselves of
this situation. The welfare of the Revolution is the highest
law. We should accept the peace which we are unable to
reject; we must secure a breathing spell to be utilized for
intensive work within the country and, especially, for the
creation of an army.

At the conference of the Communist party as well as at
the Fourth Conference of the Soviet, the peace partisans tri-
umphed. They were joined by many of those who in January
considered it impossible to sign the Brest-Litovsk treaty.
"Then," said they, "our signature would have been looked
upon by the English and French workingmen as a shameful
capitulation, without an attempt to fight. Even the base
insinuations of the Anglo-French chauvinists to the secret
compact between the Soviet Government and the Germans,
might in case that treaty had been signed find credence in
certain circles of European laborers. But after we had re-
fused to sign the treaty, after a new German invasion, after
our attempt to resist it, and after our military weakness had

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become painfully obvious to the whole world, after all this,
no one dare to reproach us for surrendering without a fight."

The Brest-Litovsk treaty, in its second enlarged edition,
was signed and ratified.

In the meantime, the executioners were doing their work
in Finland and the Ukraine, menacing more and more the most
vital centers of Great Russia. Thus the question of Russia's
very existence as an independent country is henceforth in-
separably connected with the question of the European revo-
lution.

Conclusion

When our party took over the government, we knew in
advance what difficulties we had to contend with. Economi-
cally the country had been exhausted by the war to the very-
utmost The revolution had destroyed the old administrative
machinery and could not yet create anything to take its place.
Millions of workers had been wrested from their normal nooks
in the national economy of things, declassified, and physically
shattered by the three years' war. The colossal war indus-
tries, carried on on an inadequately prepared national founda-
tion, had drained all the lif eblood of the people ; and their demo-
bilization was attended with extreme difficulties. The phe-
nomena of economic and political anarchy spread throughout
the country. The Russian peasantry had for centuries been
held together by barbarian national discipline from below
and iron-Czarist rule from above. Economic development
had undermined the former, the revolution destroyed the
latter. Psychologically, the revolution meant the awakening
of a sense of human personality among the peasantry. The
anarchic manifestations of this awakening are but the inevit-
able results of the preceding oppression. A new order of
things, an order based on the workers' own control of indus-
try, can come only through gradual and internal elimination
of the anarchic manifestations of the revolution.

On the other hand, the propertied classes, even though
deprived of political power, will not relinquish their advan-
tages without a fight. The Revolution has brought to a head
the question of private property in land and the tools of pro-

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duction — that is, the question of vital significance to the ex-
ploiting classes. Politically this means ceaseless, secret or
open civil war. In its turn, civil war inevitably nourishes anarchi-
cal tendencies within the workingmen's movement. With
the disorganization of industries, of national finances, of the
transportation and provisioning systems, prolonged civil strife
thus sets up tremendous difficulties in the way of constructive
organizing work. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government can
look the future in the face with perfect confidence. Only a
careful inventory of all the country's resources; only a ra-
tional organization of industries — an organization born of
one general plan ; only wise and careful distribution of all the
products, can save the country. And this is Socialism. Either
a complete descent to colonial status or a Socialist resurrec-
tion — these are the alternatives before which our country
finds itself.

The war has undermined the soil of the entire capitalistic
world. Herein lies our unconquerable strength. The im-
perialistic ring that is pressing around us will be burst asun-
der by the proletarian revolution. We do not doubt this for
a minute, any more than we doubted during our decades of
underground struggle the inevitableness of the downfall of
Czarism.

To struggle, to unite our forces, to establish industrial
discipline and a Socialist regime, to increase the productivity
of labor, and to press on in the face of all obstacles — ^this is
our mission. History is working in our favor. The prole-
tarian revolution will flare up, sooner or later, both in Europe
and America, and will bring emancipation not only to the
Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, but also to
all suffering humanity.

100

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By NIKOLAI LENIN

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